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ABSTRACT 
 
This research paper focuses on developing a model for the integration of the transport 
operators in the Nelson Mandela Bay area. The motivation for this integration is the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality’s Public Transport Plan, which has set the goal of 
developing a new public transport system for the Metropolitan area. This system will 
integrate the different modes of transport into a single, seamless and scheduled service 
which will adhere to contractually enforced levels of quality, reliability and safety. In 
order to achieve this vision, the current bus and taxi operators will need to be unified 
into a viable and operational entity structure which will provide the required services to 
the public. The main research problem has therefore been identified as follows: 
 
How can the bus and taxi operators in Nelson Mandela Bay be integrated into a 
single entity, or small number of entities, in order to provide a viable, efficient and 
sustainable public transport service? 
 
This research paper sought to address this problem by conducting a case study of the 
Nelson Mandela Bay project, which took place over the course of a one year period.  
The author served as the project manager on the team that was responsible for 
developing the integration model. Additional research included a study visit to the cities 
of Bogota and Pereira in Colombia, which have implemented similar transport models, 
as well as a secondary study focusing on generic organisational integration strategies in 
existing literature. 
 
This paper is fundamentally a qualitative study. In this light, the research data was 
analysed according to the quasi-judicial method, which was deemed most suitable to the 
case study format adopted. The findings of the analysis were evaluated, and based on 
the resultant conclusions, a final integration model was recommended. The fact that this 
study is based on an actual project that has real world implications and consequences 
makes the result very relevant, and as such it will serve as a valuable addition to the 
body of knowledge which can be of assistance to other cities or project teams facing 
similar challenges in South Africa or even internationally.  
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QUOTATIONS 
 
 
“Any business arrangement that is not profitable to the other person will in the end 
prove unprofitable for you. The bargain that yields mutual satisfaction is the only one 
that is apt to be repeated.”  
B. C. Forbes 
 
“My father said:” “You must never try to make all the money that’s in a deal. Let the 
other fellow make some money too, because if you have a reputation for always making 
all the money, you won’t have many deals.”” 
J. Paul Getty 
 
“There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more 
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of 
things." 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
The Prince (1532) 
 
“Change is hard because people overestimate the value of what they have—and 
underestimate the value of what they may gain by giving that up." 
James Belasco and Ralph Stayer 
 Flight of the Buffalo (1994) 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This research study relates to the achievement of mutually beneficial solutions in the 
integration of competing parties within an environment of change and uncertainty.  The 
setting within which this problem is addressed is the transport industry in the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Municipality. However, the process followed in order to arrive at a solution is 
largely applicable to similar scenarios in other industries and other geographic areas. 
 
According to the National Land Transport Transition Act 22 of 2000 (chapter 2, section 4), 
a clear vision for public transport in South Africa is set forth. Among the key stipulations in 
the vision, are the following: 
• Public transport services must be affordable to the public and responsive to 
customer needs;  
• They must be designed to integrate different modes of transport, to be cost efficient, 
to achieve service quality, to use available resources optimally, to use the most cost-
effective modes (bearing in mind customer needs), to have value for the customer, 
to be safe and to do the least possible harm to the environment;  
• Subsidies must be aimed to assist marginalised users and those with poor access to 
social and economic activity;  
• Public transport must be given higher priority than private transport, and all spheres 
of government must promote public transport; and  
• The participation of all interested parties in transport planning must be promoted.  
In line with the requirements of the Act, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality has 
embarked on an ambitious programme to transform, formalise and integrate the outdated 
and inadequate public transport system in the Metropolitan area. This programme is 
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detailed in their Public Transport Plan (PTP), which forms the basis of the contextual 
overview of transport provided in chapter 2 of this paper (NMBM PTP, 2006). 
 
After extensive research and deliberation, the city decided to base its public transport 
system on established models previously implemented in countries at a corresponding 
developmental level and with a similar socio-economic profile to South Africa. Several 
countries in South America fall into this category, including Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico. 
The cities of Bogota and Pereira in Colombia were selected as examples on which the 
Nelson Mandela Bay transport system could be based. As a result, a study team from the 
city visited Colombia in October 2007, and gathered valuable data about the challenges 
faced and solutions developed during the implementation process of the transport systems 
in the cities of Bogota and Pereira. The author participated in this study visit as an 
independent consultant on the project.  
 
The key requirement imposed by the city’s public transport plan (NMBM PTP, 2006) is 
that the current operators in the local transport industry be integrated into a single, seamless 
transport service. For this purpose, the city requires the creation of a legal entity or small 
number of entities which can incorporate the current transport operators and can be 
contractually bound to provide a public transport service to the citizens of the area. This has 
the dual purpose of formalising and uplifting the currently unsubsidised taxi industry and 
improving the quality of the transport service currently provided to commuters (NMBM 
PTP, 2006).  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Given the requirements generated by the municipality’s Public Transport Plan, the main 
problem of this research paper will be stated as the following: 
 
How can the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay be integrated into a single 
entity, or small number of entities, in order to provide a viable, efficient and 
sustainable public transport service in Nelson Mandela Bay? 
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1.3 SUB-PROBLEMS 
 
A number of sub-problems will be addressed in order to develop a solution to the main 
problem. These are the following: 
 
Sub-problem one:  
What strategies are revealed in the relevant literature than can serve as a frame of reference 
for the development of an integrated public transport entity? 
 
Sub-problem two:  
What strategies have been used by other cities to assist in the creation of an integrated 
public transport service provider? 
 
Sub-problem three:  
What are the specific stakeholder requirements that need to be addressed by the solution 
selected for Nelson Mandela Bay? and 
 
Sub-problem four:  
How can the results obtained from the resolution of sub-problems one, two and three be 
combined into a model for integrating the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay? 
 
1.4 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
 
• Operating entity – A legal entity incorporating formerly independent transport 
operators, which is able to sign a public transport service contract with the city. 
• Public Transport Contract – A contract for the provision of transport services to the 
public. 
• NMBM, Metro, Municipality – Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. 
• NMBM PTP - Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Public Transport Plan. 
• ECDRT – Eastern Cape Department of Roads and Transport. 
• ABC – Algoa Bus Company. 
• PEPBOA – Port Elizabeth Private Bus Owners Association. 
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• NLTTA – National Land Transport Transition Act. 
 
1.5 DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The development of a public transport system is an ambitious undertaking, covering a 
diverse field of disciplines. It is therefore important to note, that this paper will be focusing 
on a specific sub-problem of the broader public transport initiative only, namely the 
development of an entity structure that can best house the integrated operations of the 
formerly independent transport operators in the region.  
 
Therefore, the study will focus on developing a corporate structure that will achieve the 
required integration while at the same time being capable of operating as a viable and 
sustainable business. While the results of other work-streams referred to in the NMBM 
PTP, such as those addressing route planning, bus specifications, transport scheduling and 
financial modeling, will be necessary inputs into the planning process, the resolution of 
these issues will not be within the scope of this paper. Instead, the results of any such work 
will be imported from external sources and utilised as inputs into the decision making 
process as required. 
 
1.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DEMARCATION 
 
This study will focus on developing a transport operating entity or entities specifically for 
Nelson Mandela Bay, the geographical area of which is defined in the NBMB PTP, as 
indicated in chapter 2 of this paper. 
1.7 ASSUMPTIONS 
 
No specific assumptions have been made. 
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1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research paper is based on a case study of the integration of the transport service 
providers in Nelson Mandela Bay according to the Public Transport Plan (PTP) of the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.  In conducting the research project, the following 
research methodology was followed. 
 
1.8.1 Literature study 
 
A literature study was conducted on generic integration strategies utilised to facilitate 
integration between organisations. Specifically, the two types of integration strategies that 
were examined are merger strategies on the one hand, and joint venture strategies on the 
other.  
 
Epstein (2004:3) defines a merger as the creation of a new organisation out of two or more 
organisations of more or less equal stature by pooling all resources. Das et al., (2003:1) 
describe a joint venture as a form of inter-organisational co-operation where a new 
corporate entity is created and the partners share in the equity structure of the new entity in 
some agreed proportion.  However, a joint venture need not necessarily require the creation 
of a new entity. In some cases, a purely contractual agreement partnership is sufficient for 
the purpose of creating a joint venture.  According to Young and Bradford (1977:11) a joint 
venture can be defined as, 
 
 “An enterprise, corporation or partnership formed by two or more companies, individuals 
or organisations at least one of which is an operating entity which wishes to broaden its 
activities for the purpose of conducting a new profit-motivated business of permanent 
duration.  In general the ownership is shared by the participants with more or less equal 
distribution and without absolute dominance by one party.” 
 
The aim of the literature study was to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each 
type of strategy, the major challenges that need to be overcome, and the methods required 
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to successfully create integrated organisations by utilising each strategy respectively. Based 
on the results, conclusions were drawn to establish the most suitable approach for the 
integration project in question. 
 
1.8.2 Empirical study 
 
The empirical study consisted of a case study of the integration project in Nelson Mandela 
Bay. Collis and Hussey (2003:344) define a case study as: “A methodology which focuses 
on understanding the dynamics present within a single setting; often used in exploratory 
research.” 
 
Data was gathered through the use of the following methods: 
 
• Review of strategies followed by other cities visited as part of an international 
comparative exercise; 
• Review and analysis of relevant documentation;  
• Interviews with the key stakeholders in the process; 
• A focus group exercise to evaluate the stakeholders’ response to the conceptual 
integration model; and 
• Direct observation of the integration process, from the planning stage, through to the 
negotiation and entity creation stages.  
 
Based on the data gathered, conclusions were drawn and recommendations produced. Areas 
for further research were also identified. 
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
 
The study is presented within a methodical structure, divided into sections which progress 
in a logical sequence. Each of the chapters addressed a specific sub-problem in the order in 
which they were listed and conclusions and recommendations were drawn from the data 
gathered. 
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A chapter outline is provided below, linking chapters to sub-problems. 
 
In chapter 1 an overview of the research study is presented. 
 
In chapter 2, a contextual overview of transport in Nelson Mandela Bay is provided. The 
overview presents the history of public transport in Nelson Mandela Bay, the current 
environment, the Municipality’s vision for the future and the proposed strategies to achieve 
this vision. Out of this chapter flows the reasoning and justification for the research 
problem, and the conclusion of this chapter paves the way for the literature study, which is 
presented in chapter 3. 
 
In chapter 3, a literature study is conducted where two prominent integration strategies are 
analysed. The characteristics, benefits, challenges and selection criteria of a merger strategy 
and a joint venture strategy are discussed, and conclusions drawn on the suitability of each 
for the situation at hand. 
 
In chapter 4, the results of the study trip to Colombia are presented. Based on this, 
conclusions were drawn from the lessons learned from the transport initiatives undertaken 
in the cities of Bogota and Pereira. These conclusions were applied to the situation in 
Nelson Mandela Bay, and applicable recommendations for a local transport solution are 
presented. 
 
In chapter 5, the research methodology that was used in the research study is discussed.  
 
In chapter 6, the results of the empirical study are presented and discussed. This involved 
interviews with the key stakeholders in the local transport industry. The stakeholder 
consultation process consisted of empirical research in that the specific needs of the 
stakeholders in the Nelson Mandela Bay transport industry were clearly articulated and 
used as a primary input into the development of the proposed integration model. The results 
of this chapter ensure that the solution that is developed is tailor-made for the unique 
challenges faced in Nelson Mandela Bay. 
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In chapter 7, the results of the preceding chapters are amalgamated and utilised to develop 
an integration model uniquely suited to the main problem of this research paper. 
 
Finally, in chapter 8, the conclusions based on the entire process are presented, and possible 
avenues for future research suggested. 
 
As per this structure, the study follows a systematic approach by which the background to 
the research problem is thoroughly examined, the data gathering process clearly discussed, 
the process of developing a solution carefully documented, and conclusions drawn from the 
results. 
 
1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
According to the National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA) 22 of 2000, the 
integration and improvement of public transport is a priority of the National Department of 
Transport in South Africa. At the time of this study, a number of the major cities in the 
country were in the planning stages of similar initiatives. However, at the time of writing 
this paper, no evidence could be discovered to confirm that the integration of the bus and 
taxi industries into inclusive operating entities has been fully achieved in any South African 
city. The project that is the primary focus of this case study will therefore be among the 
first, if not the first to achieve this in the country. If successful, the information gathered 
from this exercise could be of significant value to other regions facing similar challenges.  
 
Furthermore, it will add to the international body of knowledge which is continually 
expanding as more cities around the globe – particularly in developing countries - seek to 
address the challenges of integrating and formalising historically inefficient public transport 
systems. In his presentation to the visiting NMBM fact-finding team in October 2007, 
Edgar Sandoval, General Manager of the Transmilenio Bus Rapid Transit system in 
Bogota, Colombia, stated that the growing challenges of exploding urban populations, 
traffic congestion and air pollution emphasise the need for increased efficiency in the 
provision of public transport to urban communities. The thought that lessons learned in 
Nelson Mandela Bay could ease the transition of other cities towards integrated transport 
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systems is an inspiring one, and adds great significance to the conclusions that will be 
drawn from this research study. 
1.11 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to place the study into perspective by stating the main problem 
of the research along with the sub-problems. The following chapters aim at addressing the 
main and sub-problems in logical and sequential order. To lay the groundwork for this 
process, chapter 2 will provide a contextual overview of public transport in Nelson 
Mandela Bay. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN NELSON MANDELA 
BAY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To devise a strategy to achieve the integration of the taxi and bus industries in Nelson 
Mandela Bay, it is necessary to review the history and context of the transport industry in 
the region. Only by understanding the historical context of the current operators can an 
accurate picture of the needs and requirements of relevant stakeholders be developed. This 
will ensure that the strategic goals of the transport initiative are adapted to the unique 
environment and challenges that exist in Nelson Mandela Bay.  
 
In this chapter, key facts and figures from the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality’s Public 
Transport Plan, hereafter referred to as the “NMBM PTP”, or just, the “PTP” are presented 
to provide a summarised overview of transport in the region. 
 
2.2 HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY 
 
The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) was established in 2000 when the local 
authorities of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Despatch and several smaller adjacent local 
authorities were combined into one metropolitan municipality with a new demarcated 
boundary.  A map of the municipal area, with the main transport routes indicated, is shown 
in Figure 2.1  The size of the metropolitan area is about 1 950 km2 and the population was 
recorded as 1 003 790 in the national 2001 census (NMBM PTP, 2006:1). 
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FIGURE 2.1 NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
(Source: NMBM  PTP, 2006) 
 
Buses and minibus taxis are the main public transport service providers in the NMBM area. 
There is a commuter rail service between Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, however its use is 
limited to a relatively small number of residents who live within walking distance of the 
stations (NMBM PTP, 2006:9). 
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In Table 2.1 below, the levels of usage of the different modes of transport is indicated. As 
can be seen, the use of minibus taxis has increased from 1996-2001, while the use of buses 
has remained constant and rail commuter numbers have declined. 
 
 
TABLE 2.1 PUBLIC TRANSPORT MODE USAGE (PASSENGERS PER DAY BOARDING  
VEHICLES) 
Mode 1996 % 2001 % Change % 
Taxi 105 480 59 118 746 62 +13 266 +13 
Bus 62 620 35 64 485 34 + 1 865 +3 
Train 9 930 6 7 392 4 -2 538 -26 
Total 178 030 100 190 623 100 + 12 593 +7 
             (Source: NMBM  PTP, 2006) 
 
 
Travel demand in the future 
 
The future travel demand based on a revised population distribution for 2020 is shown in 
Table 2.2.  
 
 TABLE 2.2   FUTURE  TRAVEL DEMAND (PERSON TRIPS PER DAY) 
Mode      2004      2020 Growth (% p.a.) 
Non motorised   460 000    650 000 2,2 
Public transport    400 000    700 000 3,4 
Private transport    550 000    800 000 2,0 
Total 1 410 000 2 150 000 2,6 
           (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
The projected increase in total trips is approximately the same as the projected population 
growth rate of 2,5% per annum.  
 
 
 
 13 
2.3 TRANSPORT OPERATORS 
 
2.3.1 Taxi industry 
 
According to the PTP (2006:11), there are ten registered Taxi Associations (TA) based in 
the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan area.  The ten associations, and their claimed 
membership numbers are listed in Table 2.3 below. 
 
TABLE 2.3   TAXI ASSOCIATIONS, MEMBERSHIP AND VEHICLES IN NMBM (2001) 
  
Claimed 
Members 
Claimed 
Vehicles 
Verified Vehicles 
(NATIS) 
Algoa TA ATA 279 226 211 
Border Alliance TA BATA 804 877 640 
East Cape Long Distance TA ECLDTA 81 43 41 
Northern Areas Taxi Operators Ass NATOA 83 95 74 
Norwich Long Distance TA NOLDTA 114 144 100 
Uitenhage & District TA UDTA 236 311 252 
Uncedo Service TA (PE) USTA(PE) 501 630 493 
Uncedo Service TA (Uitenhage) USTA(Uit) 564 466 437 
Uitenhage TA UTA N/a - - 
Western Suburbs TA WESTA 34 54 46 
Total 2 696 2 846 2 294 
(Source: NMBM  PTP, 2006) 
 
According to the PTP (2006:11) it is difficult to estimate the actual size of the minibus taxi 
fleet as there is a poor correlation between the various vehicle data sources available.  The 
ten associations shown in Table 2.3 claim a total membership of 2 696 operators. However, 
the Eastern Cape Taxi Registrar only shows a total of 1 542 registered operators for these 
associations.  Similarly, of the 2 846 vehicles which the associations claim belong to their 
members, only 2 294 could be verified as existing vehicles in the National Traffic 
Information System (NATIS). On the other hand, the Port Elizabeth Road Transportation 
Board has issued a total of 1768 minibus taxi permits within the NMBMM area. 
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 The conflicting data from the various sources is indicated in Table 2.4 below.  
 
TABLE 2.4 ESTIMATED TAXIS IN NMBM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
 Taking into account the various sources shown in Table 2.4, it is estimated that there are 
between 2 300 to 2 600 minibus taxis operating in the NMBM, of which between 400 and 
800 may be illegal operators (NMBM PTP, 2006:12). 
2.3.2 Bus Industry 
 
The Algoa Bus Company (ABC) is the only subsidized bus operator providing commuter 
passenger services in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan area, operating approximately 
265 buses during the weekday peak periods. According to the PTP (2006:13), the results of 
on-board surveys conducted in 2001 indicated that the Algoa Bus Company transports 
approximately 65 000 passengers per day during the 1561 daily trips.  A breakdown of this 
figure between morning and afternoon trips is provided in Table 2.5 below. 
           
  TABLE 2.5 AVERAGE WEEKDAY BUS VEHICLE & PASSENGER TRIPS (2001) 
Period Vehicle Trips Passenger Trips 
AM Period 770 33 380 
PM Period 791 31 105 
Total per Day 1561 64 485 
           (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
Confirmed in 
NATIS 
LRTB Permits (LTPS) 1721 
Eastern Cape Taxi Registrar 1675 
Taxi Associations 2294 
Surveys 2835 
Vehicles in 
Database 
1768 
1800 
2846 
2835 
 
2 300 – 2 600 
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The Port Elizabeth Private Bus Owners Association consists of a small group of private bus 
operators who transport a relatively small number of passengers on a mostly charter basis. 
Estimated figures for their passenger volumes were not available at the time of the study.  
2.4 OVERALL SITUATION 
 
In order to be able to forecast future public transport demand for use in planning a long-
term public transport strategy, the NMBM decided to undertake a travel survey in 2004 of a 
randomly selected 1% sample of the metropolitan population and obtain details of transport 
use by questionnaires completed during home interviews.   
 
The travel survey indicated an estimated total of 1,4 million person trips per day in the 
Metropolitan area. 33% were by foot, 41% by private transport and the remaining 26% by 
public transport modes.  Of the motorised trips, private transport makes up 60%  and public 
transport 40%.  The public transport trips (380 000 per day) are split between the modes as 
follows:  taxis carry 75%, buses carry 23% and trains carry 2% (PTP, 2006:15).  The trips 
per mode obtained from the travel survey are shown in Table 2.6. 
 
        TABLE 2.6   PERSON TRIPS PER DAY (2004 TRAVEL SURVEY) 
Mode Person Trips % (All modes) % Private/Public 
%  
Public Modes 
Walk 460 000 33 - - 
Private vehicle 572 000 41 60 - 
Taxi (all types) 286 000 20 75 
Bus 89 000 6 23 
Train 5 000 0,4 
40 
2 
Total 1 412 000 100 100 100 
        (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
The number of persons using taxis as reported in the travel survey is almost double the 
number of persons counted boarding taxis at ranks.  This gives an indication of the number 
of illegal taxis operating within the system. 
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Trip Cost 
 
According to the PTP (2006:17), the travel survey showed that, on average, a public 
transport trip (one-way) costs approximately R4,00.  A breakdown of the travel costs across 
different modes of transport is provided in the table below. 
 
          TABLE 2.7 AVERAGE TRIP COST PER MODE (2004 TRAVEL SURVEY) 
Mode Average Trip Cost Average Trip Length Average Cost/km 
Jikileza taxi R3,50 8 km 44c 
Minibus taxi R4,03 12 km 34c 
Bus R4,20 22 km 19c 
Train R4,98 30 km 17c 
 (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
2.5 VISION FOR THE FUTURE 
 
The mission for the NMBM Public Transport Plan is based on the vision contained in the 
NMBM Integrated Development Plan, stated as follows: 
 
“To provide an efficient, safe, affordable, sustainable and accessible multi-modal public 
transport system which supports social and economic development to ensure optimal 
mobility and improved quality of life for the residents and users of the transport system in 
the metropolitan area” (NMBM PTP, 2006:5). 
 
To fulfill this vision for public transport in the region, the decision was taken that the public 
transport system must be integrated, with the integration of time-tables/schedules and 
facilities making it easy to change between modes of transport as well as between routes 
operated by different operators.  Part of the integration of the system involves integrated 
fares to make the cost of traveling independent of the number of transfers. It is the 
NMBM’s intention that road-based public transport services will be operated by way of a 
formal contract with transport operators who will supply services that are planned and 
regulated by the NMBM (NMBM PTP, 2006:7). 
 17 
 
2.6 STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THE VISION 
 
 
While the detailed operational design of the envisaged system are beyond the scope of this 
paper, a brief overview is nevertheless necessary in order to understand the context of the 
roles that the bus and taxi industry are respectively required to fulfil in the new transport 
service. Furthermore, it is an inescapable fact that the operational requirements of the new 
service will have a significant impact on the suitability of the various integration models 
that are considered, and on the negotiating process required to arrive at a final 
recommended structure.  
 
From an operational perspective, the public transport plan of the Municipality is based on a 
trunk and feeder route system. This essentially means that the city will be divided into a 
number of geographical areas (five in total) which will be connected via a number of main 
(trunk) routes. Passengers will be transported along these trunk routes by buses. In each 
area, one or more modal interchanges (bus stations) will be located. Within each 
geographical area, a large number of smaller, or feeder routes will transfer passengers from 
virtually any point in the city to the closest modal interchange (bus station). These feeder 
routes will be serviced by minibuses similar to those operated by the current taxi industry.  
(NMBM PTP, 2006:33). 
 
The difference between the current and the new system is that these feeder services will 
only operate within the confines of a specific geographical area, and will only be used to 
carry passengers along feeder routes to and from the centrally located modal interchanges. 
At the stations, commuters will then be able to transfer onto a trunk bus, which will 
transport them along the main routes to more distant parts of the city (NMBM PTP, 2006: 
34). 
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2.6.1 Proposed trunk bus network 
 
The proposed trunk bus network will form the public transport corridors and is shown in 
Figure 2.2.   
    FIGURE 2.2  PROPOSED TRUNK ROUTE NETWORK 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
The major corridors will be the Khulani Corridor from Motherwell to the CBD, Standford 
Road corridor and Cape Road corridor as depicted in Figure 2.2 above. 
2.6.2 Proposed feeder and local network 
 
According to the NMBM PTP (2006:34), the network for local and feeder public transport 
services operated by buses or minibus taxis will cover the whole metropolitan area as 
shown in Figure 2.3.  The links between the feeder and local system to the trunk bus system 
will be concentrated at the interchanges as shown in Figure 2.4.  For part of the network 
operation the use of minibus taxis will be important and the major taxi ranks are shown in 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
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 FIG 2.3 LOCAL & FEEDER ROUTE NETWORK                            FIG 2.4  MAJOR TAXI ROUTES 
AND RANKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006)     (Source: NMBM PTP, 2006) 
 
2.6.3 Organisational requirements 
 
The proposed strategy for the NMBM public transport system entails significant 
organisational changes to the local transport industry. 
 
Negotiated contracts for route operations 
 
The routes to be operated under new contracts are to be decided by a negotiation process to 
allow minibus-taxi and bus-operators currently operating to form joint operating entities 
and be part of a new contract.  The transformation will include both the Algoa Bus 
Company and the minibus-taxi operators.  The strategy will be to support current minibus-
taxi operators and the Algoa Bus Company to form new mutually-owned entities that can 
form the basis of a contract for corridors with defined routes. Only if these negotiations do 
not result in acceptable contracts, will an open tender process be used (NMBM PTP, 
2006:39). 
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The replacement of services currently provided by minibus-taxis on the various routes by 
new contract bus services will require the removal of competing taxi operations.  This will 
be necessary so that the modes do not compete for business.  Competition would have the 
effect of reducing the passenger market from each competing mode, and causing conflict 
between the operators. 
 
According to the NMBM PTP (2006:40), the following key conditions will be imposed by 
the system: 
 
• Minibus-taxi operations and current bus-operations will cease on commencement of the 
contract by the new entity;  
• The current minibus-taxi operators would either take up shares and form part of the 
entity, cease operations permanently or agree to operate on a corridor elsewhere by 
agreement with the NMBM;  
• Contract rates will be based on similar and acceptable market rates for bus contracts; 
and 
• The negotiated contract will be valid for 5 - 7 years, after which the contract could be 
renewed either by extension of the negotiated contract or by tender, according to the 
decision of NMBM and ECDRT. 
 
According to the NMBM PTP (2006, 39), the strategy is aimed at developing a framework 
within which the existing bus and minibus-taxi operations can be converted into a 
formalised, tender-based service. While the concept has been explored in South African 
cities to a very limited extent, the size and scope of this strategy will break new ground 
from a local perspective. However, similar systems have been implemented in many 
countries where it has been necessary to move from an unregulated public transport system 
to a more planned and regulated one.  Recent examples can be found in Curitiba, Brazil and 
Bogota, Colombia and also some of the more developed countries.  
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Transformation of the taxi associations   
 
The current system of associations established in the National Land Transportation 
Transition Act formalised the taxi industry into ten registered taxi associations in NMBM.  
These associations provide structure in the industry and play a valuable role by organising 
the industry in such a way that it responds to the passenger demand and changing market 
conditions (NMBM PTP, 2006:42). 
 
The transformation of the public transport network and services as envisaged in terms of 
this plan will reduce the role of associations over the long-term as minibus-taxi type 
services are transformed into contracted scheduled services.  This will provide the 
opportunity for many taxi operators to cease being members of informal taxi associations. 
Instead, they will become shareholders in a new, professional bus operation within a formal 
company structure (NMBM PTP, 2006:43). 
 
2.7 FINDINGS BASED ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT PLAN OVERVIEW 
 
It is evident from the above that the PTP proposes fundamental changes to the transport 
system in Nelson Mandela Bay. This poses a number of significant challenges to the city. 
Historically, the individual transport operators have competed for a market share of the 
commuters in the Metropolitan area. This competition has led to the development of deep-
rooted rivalry and mutual distrust within the industry, which significantly complicates the 
challenge of integrating the operators into a single service. 
 
The challenge is further exacerbated by the widely contrasting structures and operating 
styles of the bus and taxi industries. The Algoa Bus Company (the major player in the local 
bus industry), is an established corporate entity, with a mature organisational structure and 
experienced management team.  The company has decades of experience in operating a 
scheduled bus service and due to the existing interim contract with the Department of 
Transport a transfer to a new contract-based service will not present major disruption to 
their operations. 
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The taxi industry, in contrast, can best be described as a large group of sole proprietorships. 
Each taxi operator effectively runs his own business on a cash basis. Although all operators 
belong to associations, ultimately they are each responsible for their own financial survival. 
Where the bus company is a single entity, the independence of the taxi operators means that 
the taxi industry consists of approximately 2500 small businesses. Therefore, achieving a 
successful integration between the informal taxi industry, and the formal bus industry is not 
a task that can be approached lightly. 
 
If the problem is contemplated from a purely business perspective, it would make sense to 
invite an open tender, and allow interested companies to submit proposals to provide the 
services as stipulated by the contract. Indeed, this is the route that was followed in the 
examples of Bogota and Pereira in Colombia. Tenders were invited, and the best proposal 
won the bid for the contract. In South Africa this is also an option, however, since a driving 
force behind the proposed project is the uplifting and formalisation of the taxi industry, it 
was decided by the city to seek permission for the issuing of a negotiated contract, whereby 
the current operators in the city can be integrated and jointly included in the contract.  
 
While this could be considered a noble ideal, it imposes significant constraints on the 
negotiating process and on the likelihood of arriving at the most efficient solution to the 
transport challenges faced by the city. Essentially, the business criteria need to be balanced 
with the political requirements that must be adhered to in order to arrive at a recommended 
structure for the new integrated system. 
 
Another fundamental change is that this system will require strict adherence to finely 
calculated schedules. All buses on the feeder and trunk routes will be providing a scheduled 
service and will be subject to centrally planned timetables in order to ensure an integrated, 
seamless and efficient transport service for the public. While this is nothing new to the bus 
industry, it will be a significant change for the taxi industry, which currently operates on 
the principle that each operator is responsible and therefore in control of his own vehicle 
and its operations. 
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On the face of it, this seems to provide a clear delineation between the services required 
from the taxi and the bus industries respectively. Therefore, it would appear as if the 
integration problem can be solved by simply allocating the taxi industry to the feeder routes 
and the bus industry to trunk routes in the new system.  
 
However, as mentioned earlier, a key requirement of the Department of Transport is the 
formalisation and empowerment of the taxi industry, and in this regard the taxi industry has 
indicated quite emphatically (see stakeholder consultation in chapter 6)  that it is not 
interested in being limited to providing a feeder service in the new system. In fact, taxi 
operators wish to be given the opportunity to become bus operators as well. This is 
influenced in part by the fact that the bus services are expected to earn a significantly larger 
potion of the revenues in the new system, as well as the fact that as a transport service 
matures, the service gradually migrates towards placing a greater and greater reliance on 
bus services at the cost of minibus operations. 
 
With this in mind, the challenge of the city is to integrate the former bus and taxi industries 
into a legal entity or entities that can successfully represent the interests of all relevant 
stakeholders in a way that empowers the taxi industry while at the same time retaining the 
experience, established infrastructure and management expertise resident in the bus 
industry. Ultimately, the entity or entities should be capable of operating as a successful 
business to the extent that it will be able to fulfil all the requirements of the Municipality’s 
public transport contract. This means that the entity should be capable of providing a 
scheduled transport service to the public that is efficient, reliable and sustainable.  
 
This solution needs to address and satisfy requirements from both the political and business 
spheres. Political, because the stipulations of government need to be adhered to if the 
project is to succeed. And business, because ultimately the business model will be crucial if 
the new entity is to fulfil the service obligations to the public as stipulated in the transport 
contract with the city.  
 
Satisfying these seemingly contrasting requirements is a daunting challenge, and requires 
creative thinking and innovative solutions. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to break 
the problem down to its simplest principles. By doing so, it can be stated that this is 
 24 
fundamentally a problem of integrating a number of different organisations or parties in 
order to fulfil specific business requirements. So the focus therefore needs to be on finding 
a suitable integration strategy that can be considered in order to achieve the stated goals of 
the project. With this in mind, it is the logical next step to study existing literature that 
addresses this topic.  
 
Thus, with the background and context clearly sketched, the sub-problems of this paper can 
be defined as follows: 
 
• What strategies are revealed in the relevant literature than can serve as a frame of 
reference for the development of an integrated public transport entity? 
 
• What strategies have been used by other cities to assist in the creation of an integrated 
public transport service provider? 
 
• What are the specific stakeholder requirements that need to be addressed by the solution 
selected for Nelson Mandela Bay? and 
 
• What solution can be developed based on the above? 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has provided the context within which the research study will take place, and 
examined the justification for the development of the main research problem and its related 
sub-problems. In the following chapters, each of these sub-problems will be individually 
discussed, starting with the literature study in chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STRATEGIES THAT CAN BE UTILISED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
INTEGRATED PUBLIC TRANSPORT ENTITY STRUCTURE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The fulfillment of the goals of this case study requires the integration of multiple corporate 
entities in order to meet the requirements of a specific contractual agreement. Therefore, in 
order for a proposed solution to be formulated, it is necessary to examine the existing 
literature to gain insight into the strategies commonly utilised to achieve integration 
between multiple parties to achieve a common goal. The strategies that will be considered 
can be divided into two types.  
 
The first type is a full merger, where the previous identities of the partnering entities are 
fully eliminated and a single new legal entity is created to replace them.  
 
The second type of integration is a corporate alliance or joint venture, where the individual 
identities of the partnering organisations are retained. In this case, co-operation between the 
partners is formalised on either a contractual basis or through the creation of a new, jointly-
owned entity that will replace some of the functions previously fulfilled by one or more of 
the partnering entities. 
 
In the next section, the characteristics of these two strategies will be examined further in 
detail. It should be noted that the approach to the literature study will be to examine each 
integration strategy from the perspective of it’s suitability for the integration of the bus and 
taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay. Therefore, the specific characteristics of each 
strategy will be discussed in light of the implications it would have for the case study 
scenario. In this light, the key challenges, drivers of success, advantages and disadvantages 
of the two approaches will be discussed, and applied to the case at hand. 
 
 
 
 26 
3.2 MERGER STRATEGY 
 
 
A merger creates a new organisation out of two or more organisations of more or less equal 
stature by pooling all resources (Epstein 2004:3).  
 
According to Brouthers et al, (1998:348), mergers take place for three main reasons:   
 
• Mergers can be considered in order to improve the economic performance of the 
firm. This could include goals such as achieving economies of scale, spreading risk, 
reducing costs or responding to market failures;  
 
• Mergers sometimes take place because the managers of the organisations involved 
see a personal benefit in the process. Such benefits could include increased prestige 
or increased remuneration for the leadership of the firm; and  
 
• Mergers might be embarked upon for strategic reasons, such as achieving synergy, 
global expansion, market power, obtaining desired resources or the acquisition of a 
competitor. 
 
According to Brouthers et al, (1998:349) a survey of Dutch merger activities listed 17 
common motives for mergers in the following order of importance. 
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TABLE 3.1 MERGER MOTIVES 
Rank Motive 
1 Pursue market power 
2 Increase profitability 
3 Marketing economies of scale 
4 Create shareholder value 
5 Increase sales 
6 Technical economies of scale 
7 Cost reduction 
8 Create entry barrier 
9 Acquire competitors 
10 Defense mechanism 
11 Risk spreading 
12 Managerial challenge 
13 Acquire raw materials 
14 Replace inefficient management 
15 Enhance managerial prestige 
16 Differential value of target 
17 Market failure 
(Source: Brouthers et al, 1998) 
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In the Nelson Mandela Bay case study, the reason for the proposed integration does not fit 
directly into any of these categories. Instead, the integration is sought in response to a 
governmental requirement enforced upon the organisations in question. 
3.2.1 Challenges of a Merger strategy 
 
Irrespective of the reason behind them, mergers can be risky ventures. Gendron (2004:1), 
states that when judged from a financial performance perspective, 60%-70% of mergers are 
ultimately unsuccessful. A table of failed mergers is provided below. 
 
TABLE 3.2   MAJOR MERGER FAILURES 
Company Goal Results 
 Union Pacific and Southern 
Pacific 
Creation of seamless rail network from the  
Midwest to the West coast 
Goals not 
achieved 
   HFS and CUC International Creation of Cendant to build market powerhouse Goals not 
achieved 
Conseco and Green Tree 
Financial 
Increased profits Goals not 
achieved 
 Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Acquisition of competitor for market expansion Goals not 
achieved 
     Aetna and Prudential Market expansion Goals not 
achieved 
   AlliedSignal and Honeywell Combining the technical skills of two companies for 
increased competitiveness 
Goals not 
achieved 
AT&T/TCI/Mediaone Market expansion Goals not 
achieved 
   Federated Department stores 
and Fingerhut 
Acquisition of core competencies of competitor Goals not 
achieved 
Mattel and Learning Co. Market expansion Goals not 
achieved 
McKesson and HBO Market expansion Goals not 
achieved 
(Source: Gendron, 2004:2) 
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There are a number of reasons for the high merger failure-rate. Chief among these is the 
issue of incompatibility between organisational cultures. Most integration projects require 
the blending of different cultures, policies and organisations into a single functional unit in 
a compressed timeframe. This is inherently risky, and very difficult to achieve successfully.   
 
This is a particularly relevant issue, given the significant organisational differences that 
exist between the two parties in the Nelson Mandela Bay transport integration initiative. A 
thorough understanding of the impact of cultural incompatibility is therefore required if the 
outcome of this integration is to be successful. 
 
Epstein (2004:2) writes that culture clashes, confusion among staff and internal disruptions 
are common when two companies are integrated. This often leads to dramatic declines in 
employee and customer satisfaction and ultimately to significant declines in profitability. 
According to Epstein, one study showed that shareholder value was destroyed in 61% of 
recent mergers.  
 
Cartwright and Cooper (1992:5) support this viewpoint, by stating that the type of culture 
of the combining organisations, the resultant cultural dynamics and the extent and speed 
with which a unitary and coherent culture emerges, will play critical roles in determining 
the outcome of any inter-organisational combination.  
 
According to Cartwright and Cooper (1992:5), the role of human factors in merger success 
or failure is paramount. The two most important factors influencing the success of 
organisational integration are the cultural compatibility of the organsations and the manner 
in which the integration process is managed. A study conducted by the British Institute of 
Management, in 1986, found that the underestimation of cultural compatibility issues was a 
major contributor to merger failure. 
 
The integration of two organisations invariably results in a level of culture shock for the 
individuals within the two organisations. This shock is enhanced when the individuals 
involved had not chosen to make contact in the first place (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1992:78). Worryingly, this is a rather accurate depiction of the situation in the bus and taxi 
industries at the time of integration. Neither has chosen to be involved in a merger, yet they 
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are for all intents and purposes forced into the process by the requirements of the NMBM’s 
new transport contract. 
 
The clash of cultures can lead to significant disruption and unhappiness among employees. 
This generates the potential for high levels of staff turnover during and after the integration 
process. According to Gendron (2004:85), up to 47% of top managers from acquired 
companies leave within three years after the merger. Furthermore, staff turnover is not 
limited to top management. Research conducted by Cartwright and Cooper (1992:43) 
indicates that unplanned personnel losses and absenteeism occur at all levels right down to 
shop-floor and blue collar workers. 
 
It is evident, therefore, that merger strategies are extremely difficult to implement and are 
generally accompanied by a high level of risk and uncertainty. In the case of the Nelson 
Mandela Bay transport industry integration, these challenges are exacerbated by the 
existence of significant cultural and organisational differences between the bus and taxi 
operators. This does not build confidence in the success of a potential merger strategy 
between the two industries.  
 
Nevertheless, mergers remain one of the primary methods of integrating the operations of 
multiple organisations into a unified operational structure. Therefore, should a merger 
strategy prove suitable for the integration of the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela 
Bay, it is important that the risk of failure is limited to the minimum level possible. In order 
to achieve this, it is necessary to examine the drivers of success during a merger process. 
 
3.2.2 Drivers of merger success 
 
Epstein (2004:4) states that a strong post-merger integration process can overcome 
miscalculations in the merger design while conversely a weak post-merger integration 
strategy can destroy even a well-planned, considered merger. In many cases of merger 
failure, companies have either developed an inadequate post-merger integration strategy, 
or, where the strategy was sufficiently developed, have struggled to implement it 
effectively. Additionally, many companies wait too long to begin the post-merger 
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integration process. By delaying the post-merger integration strategy, a company 
undermines its prospects of merger success from the start.  
 
So how can a post-merger integration strategy be successfully developed and implemented 
to increase the chances of merger success? Epstein identifies 5 key drivers of successful 
post-merger integration.  
 
Coherent integration strategy 
 
According to Epstein (2004:5), the integration strategy of the new organisation should be 
well articulated in order to emphasise that this is a “merger of equals.” The emphasis on the 
equality of the two partners is important, as it will have significant implications for all 
stakeholders involved. A feasible time to start implementing the integration strategy is 
when the organisational structure of the new organisation is discussed and decided upon.  
 
To quote Epstein (2004:5):  
 
“It is preferable that companies begin with an open mind when designing the structure and 
not be constrained by the structure of either previous company.” 
 
This open egalitarian approach should continue throughout the post-merger integration in 
the selection of systems, processes and practices. Instead of basing decisions on the status 
quo of one parent organisation or the other, all decisions should be made on a neutral basis 
through an objective decision-making process. 
 
Strong integration team 
 
According to Epstein (2004:7), the structure, leadership and composition of the integration 
team is of vital importance to successful integration.  In Epstein’s view, the team must 
serve in a full-time capacity with sufficient resources and authority to carry out its mandate. 
A project management approach should be followed whereby the integration project team is 
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separated from the core business of the company. In other words, the integration project 
should be a dedicated resource focused exclusively on achieving a successful post-merger 
integration. The team members should be recruited from both the companies involved.  
 
This view is corroborated by Cartwright and Cooper (1992:110) who advocate the 
establishment of joint groups consisting of employees from both organisations to assist in 
the cultural integration of the merger partners. These groups should operate in a non-
threatening and collaborative manner, to address any problems that may stem from the 
merger process. 
 
A crucial aspect of the team is its leadership. It is important for the leader to be of sufficient 
seniority and strength of character to guide the team through the difficult integration 
process. Epstein (2004:7) suggests a senior executive from one of the merging companies 
as a suitable candidate. However, Cartwright and Cooper (1992:110) note that an excessive 
focus on a top-down approach may result in a heavy reliance on the “trickle-down effect” 
to reach grassroots level.  This carries the risk of slowing down the cultural change.  
 
Nevertheless, Epstein (2004:7) bolsters his argument by referring to the AOL Time Warner 
example, where the lack of strong integration leadership was held up as a key reason for the 
lack of effective communication between the two executives during the integration process. 
 
The challenge of a clash of corporate cultures during a merger has already been discussed 
above. It is the responsibility of the integration team – and its leadership - to lessen the 
impact of the culture clash in the new organisation. Failure to manage the integration of the 
company cultures efficiently can have severe consequences.  
 
In the Daimler Chrysler merger, clashes in corporate culture between the two firms led to 
financial losses and the dismissal of many key Chrysler employees. Strong leadership and 
an effective post-integration management process could have significantly reduced the 
severity of the clash of cultures and its unwanted consequences. 
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Communication 
 
Cartwright and Cooper (1992:104) state that the need for communication during a merger 
project cannot be over-emphasised. In the absence of clear and regular communication, 
uncertainty and rumours can lead employees to fear the worst. Therefore, even if there is no 
new information available, it is preferable to reaffirm this fact through active 
communication rather than allowing suspicions to grow as a result of a lack of 
communication. 
 
Similarly, Epstein (2004:9), states that poor communication leads to the spread of 
misinformation, uncertainty and exaggerated fears among employees and other 
stakeholders. Communication from senior management must therefore be “significant, 
constant and consistent” throughout the integration process. He defines the role of 
communication as follows: 
 
“It must build confidence in the merger and the integration process, reinforce the purpose 
of the merger with a tangible set of goals, and provide decisive responses to a variety of 
stakeholder concerns” (Epstein, 2003:9). 
 
Speed in Implementation 
 
According to Epstein (2004:10) companies that move too slowly in the integration process 
are exposed to significant threats. Employees may regard the slow progress as a sign of 
uncertainty and hesitation. This may drive them to seek more stable employment elsewhere. 
Customers could also fear instability and be driven to the products or services of rival 
firms. 
 
Ultimately, a lack of speedy progress creates the appearance of doubt and a lack of 
confidence, which can undermine the entire merger process. 
 
 
 34 
Aligned measurements 
 
The success of a merger needs to be evaluated according to clearly defined indicators and 
appropriate measures of success (Epstein 2004:11). For a successful post-merger 
integration these measures need to be well-aligned with the merger strategy and vision. 
Milestones and targets must be created in all areas to enable effective monitoring of 
progress. The responsibility of creating these matrices should be allocated to the integration 
team in co-operation with business and functional units. 
 
The well known JP Morgan-Chase Merger is a case study that provides a useful model for 
the study of merger processes. 
The key to post-merger integration at JP Morgan-Chase is defined in the JPMC Hexagon, 
depicted below (Epstein 2004:12).  
 
FIGURE 3.1 POST MERGER INTEGRATION HEXAGON 
 
(Source: Epstein, 2004) 
 
Fundamentally, this model recognises open communication as the foundation of successful 
post-merger integration. In fact, at JPMC senior management went so far as to emphasise 
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the philosophy of “over communication” during the integration (Epstein 2004:17).  
Communication throughout the merger was co-ordinated across all constituencies to 
achieve a consistent message. Channels of communication included letters, phone calls, 
email, presentations and town hall meetings. Through it all, the purpose and strategy of the 
merger, the status of merger events and the impact of the merger on clients and employees 
were communicated as clearly as possible to relevant stakeholders. 
 
For the Nelson Mandela Bay transport integration project, communication is an equally 
vital aspect of the integration process. The historical presence of mistrust and antagonism 
between the participants provides fertile ground for the spread of misinformation and 
rumours. The need to keep stakeholders informed, and to prevent the spread of 
misinformation should be a high priority of the project team.  
 
Based on the above, it is evident that proper planning and a well-managed integration 
process are essential to merger success. Similarly, Gendron (2004:1) states that strong 
leadership and teamwork among the personnel of both organisations involved in the merger 
are critical if the established goals are to be met.  Therefore, good planning and excellent 
communication are required to achieve satisfactory merger results.  
 
3.2.3 Suitability of a Merger strategy 
 
The sources quoted during the examination of merger strategy emphasised the severity of 
the challenges that stand in the way of successful merger implementation. The overriding 
picture that emerges is one of organisational turmoil, uncertainty and low moral among 
staff during a merger process. Ultimately, the disruption brought about by the merging of 
two companies can lead to a significant resistance to change, and result in negative 
consequences for the organisation.  Of course, these effects would vary in intensity on a 
case by case basis. However, the high failure rate of mergers (as per the table of failed 
mergers above) is worth noting and adds weight to the impression of mergers as high risk 
ventures.  
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For a merger strategy to be considered, the situation at hand needs to be evaluated based on 
the presence of significant risk factors that have been associated with failed mergers in the 
past. The key factors in this respect are:  
 
• The compatibility of the two organisations;  
• The co-operation between the two management teams; and  
• The coherence and speed with which the integration strategy can be implemented.  
 
Based on these factors, a number of immediate warning flags can be identified with regard 
to the case study at hand.  As is revealed in the stakeholder requirements review in chapter 
6, the antagonistic relationship between the two major parties in this integration-project 
presents a significant danger to the achievement of merger success. Additionally, the 
significant difference in operational and organisational structure between the two parties 
once again increases the difficulty of successful integration. As a consequence of these 
differences, the lack of a shared vision between the two parties raises the concern that the 
creation of a coherent integration strategy will be extremely challenging should a full 
merger between these two parties be selected as the way forward. 
 
In conclusion, an overview of the characteristics and challenges of historical mergers leads 
to a preliminary view that a merger strategy is not the ideal solution to the problem at hand. 
However, a more detailed assessment will be made once additional strategies and 
situational factors have been examined. As a contrast to a merger strategy, the integration 
strategy to be examined in the next section requires a less dramatic change in the 
organisational structure of the entities involved and is therefore less disruptive to the 
stakeholders involved. 
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3.3 INTER FIRM ALLIANCES AND JOINT VENTURES 
 
 
According to Adobor (2004:1), co-operative strategies in the form of inter-firm alliances 
have become an important strategic tool of firms across the industrial spectrum.  Adobor 
defines inter-firm alliances as:  
 
“Inter-organisational relationships in which autonomous firms collaborate toward some 
common objective. Such collaboration often creates non-trivial, bilateral dependence 
between the partners.” 
 
Joint ventures are a form of co-operative strategy in which co-operating partners set up a 
separate entity which is charged with undertaking a specific purpose. Joint ventures could 
therefore be considered to be a sub-class of co-operative strategies.  According to Abodor 
(2004:1), joint ventures are generally equity based relations in which partners may have 
equal or disproportionate equity.  
 
Young and Bradford (1977:11) define a joint venture as follows:  
 
“An enterprise, corporation or partnership formed by two or more companies, individuals 
or organisations at least one of which is an operating entity which wishes to broaden its 
activities for the purpose of conducting a new profit-motivated business of permanent 
duration.  In general the ownership is shared by the participants with more or less equal 
distribution and without absolute dominance by one party.” 
 
The joint venture need not be carried out through the means of a separate corporation or 
legal entity. According to Herzfeld (1990:3) this definition can be adapted to include 
additional forms of joint ventures that do not necessarily adhere to all of the criteria in this 
description. Therefore, the distinction can be made between the creation of a new joint 
venture company or entity, and the simple conclusion of a joint contract between two 
separate organisations, without establishing any new entity or organisation. These options 
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will become particularly relevant in this case study as the stakeholder requirements relating 
to the integration model are discussed in chapter 6. 
 
Joint ventures are usually established for an indefinite period. However, in the case of 
contractual joint ventures, such as in the case of the intended Transport Entity for Nelson 
Mandela Bay, this does not necessarily apply, since the joint venture will only exist for as 
long as the contract with the Municipality is in place. However, Herzfeld (1990:4) states 
that once the joint venture requires a separate management set-up instead of the part-time 
attention of the participants’ management, it has enough in common with permanent joint 
ventures to be included in this definition. 
 
A significant requirement is that the joint venture must be controlled by both the joint 
venture partners, rather than being dominated by one of the parties. According to Herzfeld 
(1990:4), a management contract can be drafted to specify the management setup of the 
new venture. Once this is contractually defined, the actual shareholding of any one 
participant is of secondary importance. 
 
Despite the above, Young and Bradford (1977:13) state that for practical reasons the 
inequality in shareholding should not extend beyond a 60 percent to 40 percent ratio. 
Franko (1971:19) suggests that a more significant disparity in shareholding usually results 
in one party eventually buying out the share of the other partner, leading to the demise of 
the joint venture as a result. Based on the literature, it is therefore advisable to retain as 
close to an equal division of shareholding as possible.  
 
3.3.1 Reasons for the creation of a joint venture 
 
According to Herzfeld (1990:10), reasons for entering into joint ventures include opening 
new territorial markets, developing and exploiting new product opportunities, merging 
related activities or just regrouping existing activities. 
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Kay (1993), as cited by Kippenberger (1997:8) describes one of the most important 
motivations behind joint ventures as the expectation that a transfer of skills and expertise 
will lead to shared benefits for both partners in the relationship.  
 
However, according to Herzfeld (1990:10) the most common reason for the creation of a 
joint venture is for the specific purpose of tendering for a specific contract or contracts. In 
this case an agreement can be drafted initially for the tendering stage only. A contract can 
be attached to the agreement stating the execution of the project, should it be won, and 
which will come into force automatically if the contract is awarded under the agreed upon 
conditions. In such a joint venture, the parties will usually share various aspects of the 
larger contract between them, and the justification for the joint venture would be that the 
two participants are able to present a more convincing bid jointly than they could on their 
own.  If the respective parties are not able to offer the full service on their own, then the 
case for a joint venture is even stronger, as the alternative would see them excluded from 
the contract altogether.  
 
This is exactly the situation that the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay are 
faced with. According to the requirements of the Department of Transport and the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (as revealed by the empirical study results in 
chapter 6), a negotiated contract for the provision of public transport in the Metropolitan 
area can only be concluded with a service provider that includes both the former bus and 
taxi industries. The social agenda behind this requirement is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6. For the purposes of selecting an integration strategy, the important fact is that 
this requirement exists and must be accommodated in the integration model that is 
followed.  The difficulties imposed by this stipulation are partly mitigated by the fact that 
the type of service that must be delivered – both feeder and trunk services – requires the 
experience of both industries. The bus industry is able to provide expertise and 
infrastructure required for trunk-bus operations, while the taxi industry can provide the 
mini-bus services required for the feeder route operations. Therefore, once a suitable 
integration model is implemented, the operational expertise of the newly integrated parties 
will be complimentary and suited to fulfilling the requirements of the transport contract.  
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According to Berg and Friedman (1978:30), as cited by Herzfeld (1990:21), most joint 
ventures are the result of unique circumstances and are aimed at achieving organisational 
goals that neither parent organisation could attain by acting alone. The majority of large 
organisations would prefer a viable alternative to starting a joint venture. It is only when the 
necessities of a particular situation leave the company with no viable alternatives that the 
firm will attempt a joint venture in order to meet its organisational goals.  
 
This suggests that many joint ventures are entered into with reluctance by one or more of 
the parent organisations. Herzfield (1990:21) states that in many instances joint ventures 
are not entered into for their intrinsic merit but as a second best solution. This in itself 
creates an increased risk of failure.  
 
However, according to Berg and Friedman (1980:85), as cited by Herzfeld (1990:21), the 
discontinuence of some joint ventures in their original form need not be considered as a 
failure. Instead, the circumstances of the case might explain the reasons for the change in 
status. In some cases, the circumstances that led to the original purpose of the joint venture 
may change over time, necessitating a review of the agreement. In other instances, joint 
ventures are created by two parties who were considering a merger, but were not certain of 
their mutual compatibility. In order to limit their risk, a joint venture is then created as an 
intermediary step that will hopefully lead to an eventual merger.  
 
Again, this is a very accurate description of the situation faced by the bus and taxi 
industries in Nelson Mandela Bay. Mutual compatibility between the two parties emerged 
as a serious concern during the examination of a merger strategy. However, the 
requirements of the transport contract make the integration of the industry a business 
imperative. In this context, a joint venture model emerges as an option worthy of serious 
consideration for the achievement of the business goals of the stakeholders.  
 
As can be seen by the above, there exists multiple reasons for the creation, continuity and 
termination of joint ventures. In the section below, the characteristics and requirements of a 
joint venture are examined in more detail. 
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3.3.2 Legal form 
 
According to Herzfeld (1990:35) the most suitable legal form for a joint venture is 
influenced by the applicable laws of the country in question. The relevant tax legislation in 
particular, will play a significant role in determining which legal structure is optimal for the 
planned joint venture. Generally, three legal forms are utilised for the creation of joint 
ventures: 
 
• A purely contractual joint venture; 
• A partnership; and 
• A limited liability company. 
 
In cases where a joint venture entity is for some reason undesirable, a joint venture contract 
will be a viable alternative. In such a case, the contractual agreement between the parties 
will seek to duplicate as closely as possible the characteristics of a company, without 
establishing a separate legal entity. Herzfeld (1990:35) states that a purely contractual set-
up would not usually be suitable for ventures of an undefined duration. 
 
In a solely contractual relationship, one of the key aims of the contract will be to define the 
liabilities of the parties towards each other. The importance of default clauses in the 
contract should not be overlooked. This serves both as a disincentive for one party to 
default on their side of the contract, and as a method by which the joint venture can be 
continued despite any such default on the side of one of the parties. In the end, a solid 
contractual agreement provides assurance to the client of the joint venture that the agreed 
upon service will be rendered, irrespective of the fact that disagreements may arise between 
the parties that participate in the creation of the joint venture (Herzfeld, 1990:37). 
 
Limited liability company 
 
According to Herzfeld (1990:38), the majority of long-term joint ventures are operated by 
establishing a new corporate entity. The chosen legal format will vary from country to 
country. In South Africa it will usually be a private limited company – (Pty) Ltd.  Herzfeld 
(1990:5) states that shareholding should be divided as evenly as possible between the two 
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joint venture partners, within a range of 60%-40% on either side. While the shareholding 
will determine the division of ownership of the joint venture between the respective parties, 
it is a separate contractual agreement between the parties that will determine the important 
issues such as management representation, decision making and the respective 
responsibilities both parties should fulfill with respect to the new joint venture entity.  
 
In Nelson Mandela Bay, a key issue of contention that has emerged during negotiations 
between the parties (see chapter 6) is the relative shareholding of the partners. A well-
defined contractual agreement is one way in which issues such as control of the operation, 
decision making and representation on the board of directors can be addressed without 
relying on the relative shareholding of the partners. This is examined in further detail in 
chapter 7, where the most important issues that the contract should address, are reviewed.  
3.3.3 Inter-organisational challenges of joint ventures 
 
Bartoloma, et al., (2003) state that small differences in management style and culture 
between the co-operating firms in a joint venture can become serious problems due to the 
limiting effect it has on the creation of synergies.  
 
While some of these issues, such as differences in size and structural design, can be 
identified up front, many others such as honesty and trust are harder to evaluate until the 
relationship has been established.   
 
Herzfeld (1990:25) contends that conflicts of interest are a natural outflow of the operation 
of the majority of joint ventures. Often one of the participants will pursue benefits for 
himself rather than for the joint venture. In fact, from the very beginning participants could 
be looking ahead to benefits that are attainable through the termination, even through the 
premature termination of the joint venture. Herzfeld describes this as “competitive 
collaboration”, or “takeover by stealth.” 
 
Koeszegi (2004:7) states that the building of trust is an integral part of inter-organisational 
negotiations. Kippenberger (1997:1), focuses on the issue of trust by applying game theory 
as demonstrated by the well known “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to the relationship between joint 
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venture partners. The prisoner’s dilemma (attributed to Albert Tucker) represents a 
hypothetical situation where two prisoners are accused of committing a crime together.  
They are separated and prevented from communicating with one another in any way. 
Despite having no hard evidence against them, the sheriff presents the following 
information to each of the two: If they both confess, they will get a relatively light (seven 
year) sentence. If only one prisoner confesses, he will go free with a reward, while the other 
will get ten years in prison. If neither confesses, they will both be given one year sentences. 
 
Each prisoner can decide how he will respond, but the outcome of his response will depend 
on the actions of the other prisoner. The possible outcomes can be shown in a payoff 
matrix, which is presented below. 
   
   FIGURE: 3.2 PRISONER’S DILEMMA PAYOFF MATRIX 
 
  (Source: Adapted from Kippenberger: 1997)  
 
As can be seen on the payoff matrix, the level of trust between the prisoners will determine 
the payoff that each will receive. If they don’t trust each other, both are likely to confess, 
since they will suspect the other will try to serve their own interests first. As a result, both 
will end up with seven years imprisonment. This is far from the most favourable result 
where, if they had trusted one another, neither would have confessed, trusting the other to 
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do the same. Then they would both have received only a one years sentence. The 
conclusion is that due to the need to serve their own interests first and foremost, and based 
on a lack of co-operation between the two parties, the full benefits of the partnership were 
not realised. Instead, the self interest of each prisoner led to a less than satisfactory result 
for both. 
 
Kippenberger uses this principle in explaining the relationship in a joint venture. Each firm 
will be unsure of how the other will behave. Despite the inherent benefits of total co-
operation, if one firm holds back, game theory suggests that the second will hold back too. 
And even if the one firm co-operates, distrust by the other party will still lead them to see a 
possible benefit in not reciprocating, as this will be the safer option. By holding back, the 
second firm will gain benefits from the co-operation of the first firm, without having to 
share those benefits with the other party. Since both firms will use this reasoning, the likely 
result of the joint venture is that both firms will hold back from full co-operation with the 
other. 
 
So how can the parties in a joint venture break through this dilemma? According to 
Kipenberger, this can only be achieved through the establishment of a long term 
relationship between the parties. In the initial exchanges, the self-serving choices of both 
parties will be based on mistrust and suspicion. This is particularly reminiscent of the 
situation between the bus and taxi industry in Nelson Mandela Bay. However, once the 
“game” has been repeated an uncertain number of times, the pessimistic view of this 
outcome could change as a form of co-operation is gradually established. Game theory 
suggests that the players would react in a “tit-for-tat” manner. If one party is nice, the other 
will be too, the next time around. In the same way, if one party acts in self interest, the 
other will follow suit in the next round of decision-making. As the relationship develops 
over time however, the players will eventually behave in a manner that leads to the greater 
long-term benefit of both partners. In this way, the prisoners in the original scenario will 
learn that it is better for both if neither confesses to the crime (Kippenberger, 1997:2). 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma deals with the issues relating to cooperation between joint venture 
partners on an inter-firm level.  Bartoloma (2003:1), in turn, focuses on specific 
consequences of joint ventures from the internal perspective of a cooperating firm. 
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According to Bartoloma (2003:2), a strategic alliance usually introduces a series of changes 
in the co-operating organisation’s behaviour.  These changes can result in conflict with the 
firm’s personnel and even lead to failure of the co-operation between the two entities. 
Conflicts often arise at points in the implementation where individuals who have not been 
involved in the negotiations up until that point, are affected by the change. These 
individuals can be a threat to the negotiated agreement for a number of reasons, which are 
listed below: 
 
• Their lack of involvement in negotiations may mean that they do not understand the 
strategic benefits or even necessity of the co-operative strategy; 
 
• Low ranking employees may be less experienced at working with people from other 
cultures; 
 
• There may be individual groups who oppose the proposed relationship based on 
independent interests which differ from those of the organisation as a whole; and 
 
• Some executives may consider the alliance to be a threat to their positions. 
 
According to Bartoloma (2003:2): 
 
“…the cornerstone for the implementation of an effective co-operative strategy is an 
appropriate management that tries to obtain the personnel’s wholehearted collaboration.” 
 
Due to natural organisational resistance to change, this goal can be extremely challenging, 
however. Bartoloma concludes that human and cultural aspects alone can decide the 
success or failure of a corporate alliance. Therefore, the need for the leadership from both 
sides to be well versed in this field is of paramount importance. 
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3.3.4 Operational challenges of joint ventures 
 
Herzfeld (1990:24) states that joint control of an organisation means joint decision making. 
This naturally is a difficult adjustment to make for executives who are used to being in total 
control of the decision-making process at their organisations. This problem extends beyond 
the narrow issue of decision-making, and includes the broader concept of the management 
style of the organisation. Everything that can be affected by this management style now 
becomes part of this issue.  
 
This problem is accentuated where the management styles of the two parties to the joint 
venture contrast, specifically from the perspective of centralised versus divergent decision-
making. Under a centralised management style, decisions are taken fairly quickly, whereas 
the resolution of issues takes significantly longer under a more divergent management 
approach. This difference in the timescales of decision-making can generate significant 
stresses between the partners (Herzfeld, 1990:24). 
 
An extremely important issue is the composition of the joint venture’s board. It is vital that 
it function effectively, yet to do so its members will be required to regularly attend 
meetings, which may necessitate the exclusion of top board members from one of the 
parent companies due to existing commitments in their current positions. This can present 
difficulties if the representation from the board of the other parent company is not restricted 
in this way, as it can be seen as a lack of commitment from one side of the partnership 
(Herzfeld, 1990:24). 
 
A further complication is that joint ventures are usually initially staffed by seconding 
employees from the parent companies of the joint venture. This is understandable, given the 
possible temporary nature of the joint venture, and the lack of job security that this implies 
to a prospective employee. A secondment makes sense, since any employees that are no 
longer needed at the termination of the joint venture can simply return to the parent 
company which holds their employment contracts. 
 
While this makes sense from a practical perspective, it also means that employees will 
remain loyal to the parent company rather than to the joint venture company, which could 
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lead to further conflict and undermining of the position of the joint venture. It should also 
be noted that since the circumstances surrounding the joint venture are not static, and as 
changes occur over time, whether they be successes or unforeseen difficulties, the views of 
participants may also change accordingly. This means that the position of the joint venture 
is always accompanied by a lot of uncertainty (Herzfeld, 1990:25). 
 
3.3.5 Drivers of joint venture success 
 
In the previous section, the challenges of joint ventures have been duly examined and 
discussed. However, as in the case of merger strategies, these challenges are not 
insurmountable. Their resolution merely requires proper planning, effective leadership and 
the implementation of a people-focused change management process. In this section, the 
key aspects of such a process are discussed. 
 
Preparing leadership to manage change  
 
According to Harris Helmer (2002:1) the leadership of an organisation contemplating a 
joint venture need to be educated on how to manage change effectively. Management need 
to be prepared to deal with the issues that will inevitably arise out of the change process. 
 
Firstly, individuals in management positions need to explore and learn to manage their own 
reactions to change.  The attitude of management will have a significant impact on lower 
level staff, and therefore, any management frustrations and negative feelings surrounding 
the change process need to be managed in such a way that it does not flow through to their 
subordinates in the firm. 
 
Preparing the leaders of the bus and taxi industry for the challenges of the integration 
project is a necessary pre-requisite to the successful management of the integration process. 
Without a core group of influential leaders that support and drive the process, there can be 
little hope of steering the organisations in their entirety through a successful change 
process. 
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Dealing with the impact of change 
 
Every individual views organisational change from the perspective of how he or she will be 
personally affected. Therefore, employees need to be assisted to navigate through the 
uncertainties of the change process. In order to make informed decisions about their lives, 
employees require accurate information about how the joint venture process will affect 
them. According to Harris Helmer (2002:2), few of the details regarding the change process 
are usually available when the joint venture is first announced. Leaders are therefore 
confronted with a difficult decision. They can either share incomplete information with 
employees, which can generate a lack of confidence in the change process, or they can 
withhold information from their subordinates, which can generate an atmosphere of 
suspicion, mistrust and lead to the spread of misinformation. 
 
Harris Helmer(2003:2), therefore, recommends that leaders share the information that they 
have up front and then lay out a clear timeline with the steps that still need to be taken to 
manage the expectations of employees going forward. The longer the dissemination of 
information is delayed, the greater the danger of increased concerns, rumour mongering and 
uncertainty that will lead to resistance to the change. 
 
The taxi industry in Nelson Mandela Bay consists of more than 2000 individual operators. 
Similarly, the bus industry employs hundreds of staff members to run their current 
operations. Each of these individuals will be concerned about the consequences that the 
integration of the two industries will have for them as individuals. Yet negotiations cannot 
be conducted with every single affected individual. Therefore, the impact of the change on 
each person must be considered and the impact on the process evaluated. Integration 
planning should then be made with these factors in mind. Perhaps the most important factor 
identified as a contributor to successful change management, is communication. 
 
Communicating the change 
 
Harris Helmer (2002:2) advocates the concept of “leading from the heart and following 
with the head”. This means that the leadership first has to win over the hearts of employees 
before they will follow them with their heads. Therefore, the manner in which the change 
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process is communicated through to stakeholders is extremely important. The best way to 
achieve this, according to Harris Helmer (2002:2), is to first communicate the benefits that 
the change will have for the organisation and in particular, for the individuals themselves, 
before acknowledging the impact that the change will have on the lives of stakeholders. 
Therefore, the “why” of the change is discussed and emphasised with the affected 
individuals first, before the “what” and the “how.” Often leadership is so eager to define the 
timeframes, details and requirements of the proposed change that they overlook the need to 
first give employees the opportunity to grasp the need for the change in the first place. 
 
In the case of the taxi and bus industry integration this challenge will be exacerbated by the 
fact that the leadership of the two organisations are distrustful of their counterparts and to 
some extent remain to be convinced of the merits of such a proposed integration. Therefore, 
the need for a clear integration process, and an open and honest communication policy is of 
particular importance.  
  
Leadership also needs to be careful with the expectations that they are creating during the 
change process. The concept of “under-promise and over-deliver” is a vital one during a 
joint venture change process. During the period of uncertainty, the change team is under 
immense pressure to provide stakeholders with guidance, certainty and clear answers to 
important questions. This pressure can lead the leadership to make unrealistic promises and 
guarantees such as when the agreement will be reached, when more information will be 
available or how many jobs will be created in the new joint venture. According to Harris 
Helmer (2002:2), it is best not to promise anything. Should the leadership wish to share 
timelines with employees and other stakeholders, care must be taken to emphasise that 
these timelines are tentative.  
 
Employees place great reliance on any promises made during this period, and should any of 
them remain unfulfilled or require modification, the impact can be devastating. The golden 
rule thus, remains “under-promise and over-deliver.”  In general, a balance should be struck 
between saying too much or saying too little. That is why a change process is so 
challenging, and why it is so difficult to negotiate successfully. 
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Due to the challenges and resistance experienced in the transport industry integration in 
Nelson Mandela Bay, it would be extremely tempting for leadership to share the “good 
news” with sceptical stakeholders to get their initial buy-in into the project or to counter 
mounting resistance during the early or middle stages of the integration. However, should 
some of these raised expectations not be met as promised, the consequences could be 
significantly worse than if expectations were managed properly right from the start. 
 
Working with the survivors of the change 
 
The net effect of organisational change will be that some employees will leave the firm due 
to job losses, job changes or the transition of some employees to a new organisation. Once 
these changes have settled in, it is important for leadership to focus on the interests and 
futures of those who remain with the organisation after the changes have been completed. 
Harris Helmer (2002:2) states that leadership in the past has focused too heavily on catering 
properly for those who were leaving the firm at the expense of those who survived. It will 
be the survivors who will carry the firm’s operations forward, and on whom the future 
success of the organisation will depend.  
 
Survivors should be given the opportunity to settle into the changed environment they will 
be faced with and be given a sense of security regarding the future with the organisation. 
They should be given a chance to grieve over the loss of some of their former colleagues. 
To this end, the facilitation of a series of structured discussions regarding their experiences 
during the change process can be of great benefit to the organisation. 
 
Protecting the business from change 
 
According to Harris Helmer (2002:3), a critical aspect that leaders should prepare for, is the 
protection of the business during the turbulent times of change. The uncertainty 
experienced during a change process can have significant impact on the productivity and 
performance of employees. It is the responsibility of leaders to monitor the warning signs 
of potentially disruptive behaviour and to manage the employees reaction to the change 
process to the greatest extent possible. 
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3.3.6 Suitability of a joint venture strategy 
 
The advantages offered by the creation of a joint venture depend largely on the unique 
circumstances that necessitated the parent companies to consider an alliance in the first 
place. General advantages can vary from providing a limitation to the investment required 
from each partner in the venture, to the limitation of the risk of failure of the enterprise. A 
significant advantage can also be gained from the merging of the skills and expertise of the 
two participating organisations. Herzfeld provides the example of one company 
contributing great technical skills while the other partner provides the financial resources to 
make a joint success of a project or enterprise (Herzfeld, 1990:23). 
 
For the Nelson Mandela Bay integration project, a joint venture model addresses the 
following key stakeholder requirements, as revealed in chapter 6: 
 
• It will allow for the required integration of the two industries; 
• It will allow each of the parent organisations to retain their separate identities; 
• It will allow for the successful transfer of skills from the bus to the taxi industry; 
• It will ease the change process, as a joint venture will not be as radical a transformation 
as the total merging of the two industries; 
• It will allow the two industries a trial period of 10 years during which they can explore 
the viability of a full merger; 
• It will allow each of the parties at least the opportunity to withdraw from the joint 
venture should they feel disadvantaged by the process; and 
• It will enable the process to be approached as a “partnership between equals”. 
 
The joint venture approach is therefore able to address a number of the shortcomings of a 
merger strategy in the case study scenario, specifically that of the retention of the individual 
identities of the participants. At the same time, a joint venture strategy is still able to 
duplicate the majority of the integration characteristics of a merger strategy, such as the 
transfer of skills and the conclusion of joint contracts with the NMBM.  In the light of the 
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above, it would appear that a joint venture strategy offers a more viable and universally 
acceptable overall solution to the main research problem than a merger approach. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, two prominent options for the creation of an integrated transport entity have 
been introduced. In each case the characteristics of the strategy were examined, the 
challenges considered and the advantages and disadvantages reviewed. To provide a 
transport service based on the strategic, political and contractual requirements of the 
scenario, the parties involved will need to be integrated into a unified entity or small 
number of entities. The strategies discussed in this section provide the most commonly 
employed methods of achieving such integration between business partners.  
 
After completing the literature study, a joint venture option appears to be significantly more 
viable than a merger between the two industr ies. This conclusion is based on the following 
key factors: 
 
• The contrasting organisational cultures of the participants in the integration process 
make a merger less likely to succeed than a joint venture; 
• The ability to retain the separate identities of the participating organisations in a 
joint venture, as opposed to a merger where the participants are joined together on a 
permanent basis; 
• The ability to provide a viable exit strategy for all participants by simply ending the 
joint venture contract. This option is not available in a merger, where the previous 
identities of the partners have been totally merged; 
• The mistrust and lack of co-operation that exists between the leadership of the 
respective participants make a merger strategy extremely difficult to undertake 
successfully; 
• A joint venture provides for an easier transition for the participants from 
competitors to partners, and allows them to explore the possibility of a full merger 
at a later stage; and 
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• The fact that the integration is taking place for the purpose of meeting the 
requirements of a specific, fixed-term tender or contract corresponds to one of the 
key reasons for considering a joint venture strategy. After the contract ends, all 
participants are free to go their separate ways once more. 
 
The above factors strongly indicate that a joint venture strategy is the more viable option 
for this case study.  However, the literature study also highlighted the risks associated with 
a joint venture strategy, and emphasised in particular the critical importance of the building 
of trust between the partners in the venture. The need for open and honest communication 
and honourable negotiations between the parties is such that without it a successful 
outcome will be very difficult to achieve.  
 
Given the above, further investigation is required before a final decision can be taken with 
regard to the most suitable integration strategy for this case study.  In the next chapter, 
strategies utilised by other cities will be investigated and compared to the scenario faced in 
Nelson Mandela Bay. In chapter 6 the key requirements generated by the stakeholder 
consultation process will be discussed.  Using all of the information gathered in previous 
chapters, the strategies will then be evaluated in chapter 7 and a final option selected which 
best meets the criteria produced during the research process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERNATIONAL STUDY – INTEGRATED TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
DEVELOPED BY OTHER CITIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In October 2007, the author was part of a fact-finding delegation from Nelson Mandela Bay 
that visited the cities of Bogota and Perreira in Colombia, to study the transport models 
which have been implemented there. Several presentations were conducted by 
representatives of Transmilenio and Megabus, the companies that operate the transport 
systems in Bogota and Pereira respectively. The facts that emerged from the presentations 
showed that the transport environment in these cities display significant similarities to that 
of Port Elizabeth. The data gathered during this visit is presented in the remainder of this 
chapter as documented by the author while in Colombia. 
4.2 BOGOTA 
 
Mr. Edgar Sandoval, former General Manager of Transmilenio, presented the model 
implemented by Transmilenio in Bogota.  
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FIGURE 4.1 HISTORICAL TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN BOGOTA 
 
(Source: Edgar Sandoval, Bogota Transport presentation, October, 2007) 
 
The diagram above depicts Bogota’s historical transport system. Spelling errors are due to 
the incorrect translation from Spanish to English by the original source of the diagram. 
Bogota’s system relied on individual taxi and bus owners for the provision of public 
transport to commuters. This is very similar to the historical situation in South Africa. 
Routes were awarded to “affiliated enterprises” who acted as middlemen between 
government and the individual owners. Vehicle owners had to pay these middlemen in 
order to operate their private bus and taxi services on specific routes. The owners, in turn, 
provided their vehicles to the drivers, who guaranteed an agreed upon daily payment to the 
owner in exchange for the vehicle. Finally, the driver would then operate the vehicle and 
collect fares from commuters. 
 
This system generated significant inefficiencies as each of the intermediaries in the 
transport chain needed to skim profit out of the system to survive. In addition, the system 
incentivised drivers to transport the maximum number of passengers per day in order to 
maximise their profit over the standard payment made to the vehicle owners. Therefore, as 
in South Africa, overloading of buses, chaotic and irresponsible driving practices and lack 
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of adherence to schedules were the order of the day, as drivers competed for passengers on 
each route.  
 
The end result was that the intermediaries benefited out of the situation at the expense of 
commuters. The system also resulted in an overcapacity of vehicles and increased 
congestion on the roads, as large numbers of small vehicles inefficiently competed to 
transport the growing population of the city on the limited road network. 
 
In 2000 a new mayor, Enrique Penalosa, took control of Bogotá and concluded that the 
negative incentives embedded in the institutional and organisational setup were to a large 
extent responsible for the low level of service and chaos in the streets. Peñalosa appointed a 
team of experts to design a system that would eradicate the “penny war” for transportation 
routes. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 REDESIGNED TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN BOGOTA 
 
 (Source: Edgar Sandoval – Bogota Transport presentation, October, 2007) 
 
The diagram above depicts the re-designed transport system in Bogota, and the resolution 
of the problems associated with the old system. In the new system, the individual vehicle 
owners were required to buy shares in new companies that led to the consolidation of the 
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multiple individual operators into a small number of transport entities. Owners purchased 
shares on a voluntary basis if they wished to form part of the new system.   
 
The municipality then awarded transport contracts directly to the new transport companies 
on an open tender basis. The intermediaries were therefore, completely removed from the 
chain as the contractual arrangement now existed directly between the service provider and 
the local government. The companies were paid per kilometer traveled according to the 
contractual agreement, not per passenger carried. This is an important distinction, as it 
removed the incentive for overloading or rogue activity on behalf of the operators.  
 
Drivers were now issued formal employment contracts by the transport companies and with 
no incentive left to compete for extra passengers, the need for irresponsible driving was 
completely removed. In fact, the formal contractual arrangement between the city and the 
transport companies allowed the municipality to include specific penalties for lack of 
compliance with specified safety and operating standards. Financial incentives in the end 
proved to be highly effective, and the penalty/bonus system ensured that each company 
tried to outdo its competitors in trying to meet their specified contractual requirements 
(Edgar Sandoval – Bogota presentation, October, 2007). 
 
The transport companies benefited from dedicated bus lanes that the city constructed for 
their exclusive use, with the result that their services could be provided more efficiently and 
effectively than private operators who chose to continue operating independently rather 
than join the new companies. Commuters also benefited from a new, scheduled and reliable 
transport system that provided them with a significantly more efficient manner of transport 
within the city (Edgar Sandoval – Bogota presentation, October, 2007). 
 
4.2.1 Contracting of companies 
 
In Bogota, seven companies were contracted to operate the trunk route services and six to 
operate the feeder routes. These companies were required to submit detailed proposals in 
response to the tender request, based on the requirements stipulated by the city. The 
winners of the bidding process were awarded ten-year concessions to operate on specified 
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routes in the BRT system. They were selected purely on the business case they presented, 
with the best bids being awarded the biggest fleet in the contract. Kilometers were then 
allocated to the seven trunk line operators by the government based on the number of buses 
owned. For example, if there were 200km of trunk routes to be assigned, the operator who 
owned 150 out of 200 buses would be assigned 150km to operate on (Edgar Sandoval – 
Bogota presentation, October, 2007). 
 
4.2.2 Comparison with Nelson Mandela Bay 
 
The Bogota model contains significant similarities to the Nelson Mandela Bay Public 
Transport Plan. The replacement of independent transport operators with a formalised, 
scheduled transport service operated by contractually appointed transport service providers 
is exactly the model that Nelson Mandela Bay wishes to implement. The integration of 
independent operators into formalised transport companies is also an example that Nelson 
Mandela Bay wishes to follow.  
 
However, there are also significant differences to the South African situation. The primary 
difference is the fact that in Bogota the transport contracts were awarded to the operators on 
an open tender basis. This means that any company that met the required criteria could 
submit a bid for a contract. All bids would then be evaluated on a merit basis and the best 
bid would be awarded the contract a pre-determined number of years.  
 
In Nelson Mandela Bay, a negotiated contract is prescribed, which requires the inclusion of 
all the major stakeholders in the local transport industry. This significantly complicates the 
formation of transport companies, since more participants need to be satisfied in the 
process. 
 
In terms of the primary problem of this case study, the Bogota example demonstrates that 
the fundamental driver of an integrated transport service is a profitable business model. 
Ultimately, the transport operators will base their decision to join the new entity or not, on 
the financial implications it will have for them. If they are better off in the new system than 
they were before, they will be interested in joining it. If not, they will be very reluctant to 
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participate. This lesson needs to be borne in mind during the development of a solution for 
the Nelson Mandela Bay transport situation. 
 
4.3 PEREIRA 
 
The Pereira presentation was conducted by the General Manager of Megabus, Ms. Monica 
Vanegas. Megabus is the transport agency in the city of Pereira, which has a population of 
roughly 1 million people (similar to Port Elizabeth). Megabus controls 53 articulated buses, 
83 feeder buses, 36 stations and two terminals. Due to its comparable size to Port Elizabeth 
and the greater Nelson Mandela Bay area, Pereira is an even more suitable example for the 
Nelson Mandela Bay transport model than Bogota (Monica Vanegas, Pereira presentation, 
October, 2007). 
In Pereira two transport companies were contracted to operate in the BRT system. Both 
companies operate on both the trunk route and feeder route systems. Efforts were also made 
to unite several smaller operators into new companies that could tender for the Megabus 
transport contracts. Irrespective of the success or failure of these efforts, the contracted 
companies were selected through a normal tendering process. 
Eligibility for shares in the new companies was based on the number of vehicles owned by 
the independent operator that wished to form part of the new entity. The vehicles entitled 
the operator to a proportional number of shares in the new company. It was then up to the 
operator to decide whether he was interested in purchasing his allocated portion or not. In 
this way, small operators were able to gain access to part of the overall contract, via 
shareholding in contracting companies (Monica Vanegas, Pereira presentation, October 
2007). 
 
With regards to the transport contracts, each contracting company was required to purchase 
(and then scrap) eight old buses for each new trunk bus, and one old bus for each new 
feeder bus they would be operating in the Megabus system. This mechanism resulted in the 
removal of several hundred old buses from the road system, alleviating traffic congestion. 
In fact, as a result of this, the number of old buses in the city was reduced from an original 
1100, to the current 550 (Monica Vanegas, Pereira presentation, October, 2007).  
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In addition to purchasing the old buses for scrapping, the companies were also responsible 
for purchasing the new vehicles that would be used in the system. Both companies operate 
on both the trunk and feeder routes. So the key issue identified here, is that the tendering 
companies required substantial access to capital in order to meet all of these requirements.  
The operating contracts were awarded for 17 years in Pereira. As in Bogota, the length of 
the contract is determined by the business model, which must provide an adequate return on 
investment for the companies that are selected (Monica Vanegas, Pereira presentation, 
October, 2007). 
 
Megabus, like Transmilenio in Bogota, emphasised the importance of the business case in 
designing their system. In other words, the number and types of buses, selection of 
operators, fee structure and importantly, the length of the operating contracts were all based 
on the requirements to operate profitably per kilomter traveled, and to offer an agreed upon 
return on investment for the operators over the length of the contract. Megabus’s only 
criteria for selecting the operating entities was that there be at least two – for healthy 
competitive purposes, and that some efforts be made to incorporate some smaller operators 
into the system. However, in the end, the best candidates were selected based on the 
business case presented (Monica Vanegas, Pereira presentation, October, 2007). 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Emphasis should be placed on the fact that turnaround was achieved in both Colombian 
cases from old, dysfunctional transport systems to modern, scheduled services providing 
quality transport to thousands of commuters on a daily basis. 
 
The old systems were based on individual operators competing in a chaotic environment for 
the maximum number of passengers. The new system, however, eliminated the need to 
compete for passengers through the implementation of a kilometer based reward system. 
This is similar to what government wants to achieve in Nelson Mandela Bay.  
 
Therefore, the key to the success of the new system was based on two main elements. 
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The first principle is that the vehicles were no longer privately owned by the individual 
owners, but by the collective company instead. This meant that competition was eliminated 
between individual owners. Secondly, fee collection was transformed from a passenger- to 
a kilometer based system. These two aspects are crucial to the success of the entire model. 
 
From an entity creation point of view, the need to have a systematic way of allocating share 
ownership in the new companies was also clear, especially in Pereira. The Colombia 
examples do not show preference towards either a merger or a joint venture strategy, as the 
companies formed in the cities of Bogota and Pereira were entirely new creations, and 
former operators were free to purchase shares in them on a voluntary basis. The need to 
accommodate all existing stakeholders, whether individual operators or juristic persons 
such as established bus companies, did not exist. This is a major difference with the Nelson 
Mandela Bay situation.  
 
However, a valuable lesson that can be learned is that whatever integration mechanism is 
selected, it needs to ensure that every new owner brings something to the table which can 
be measured in terms of the value added against that of his co-owners. In the case of 
Pereira, the number of vehicles owned was a good yardstick to use. In the case of Nelson 
Mandela Bay, the possession of a valid operating license would serve as the entry 
requirement for potential shareholders in the new structure. 
 
The length of the contract would determine the number of total kilometers allocated to a 
company over the course of the contract. That in turn, would determine the total revenue of 
the company over the full term of the contract, which would determine whether an adequate 
return is earned for the capital invested at the start. An operator’s decision to join the new 
company or not would therefore, be purely based on the financial return that the investment 
offers to him. Ultimately, it can therefore be seen that the business case influences almost 
every facet of the project, and should be a key factor in every decision pertaining to the 
transport plan as a whole. 
 
The visit to Colombia was extremely useful in providing case studies similar to the 
transport model that Nelson Mandela Bay is planning to implement, dealing with similar 
issues, challenges and suggested solutions. The key to success will be to use what was 
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learned in Colombia, but to apply it in a South African context to resolve the uniquely 
South African challenges that Nelson Mandela Bay is presented with. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter addresses the research design, methodology and methods of data collection 
used in this study. A detailed discussion of each of these aspects will be presented. The 
focus of the research design and methodology will be to answer the main research problem, 
i.e.  
 
How can the bus and taxi operators in Nelson Mandela Bay be integrated into a single 
entity, or small number of entities, in order to provide a viable, efficient and 
sustainable public transport service? 
  
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003:113), research design is the detailed plan which 
guides and focuses the research.  
 
5.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
 
Information was gathered through both primary and secondary research, as indicated 
below. 
 
5.3.1 Primary study 
 
The primary study was based on a case study of the Nelson Mandela Bay transport 
integration project. The author of this paper was directly involved in the project over a 
period of approximately one year. The goal of this project was to incorporate the formerly 
independent transport operators in the region into a new, integrated operating entity. The 
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process that was followed to develop an integration model that achieves the project goal is 
documented in this paper. 
 
In order to develop a solution that is suitable for Nelson Mandela Bay, it is necessary to 
understand the complete set of stakeholder requirements that the solution will need to 
address. To achieve this, it is necessary to identify the relevant stakeholders in the proposed 
project. The exercise of compiling a list of stakeholders falls outside the scope of this 
paper, as it was provided to the project team by the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 
based on an extensive and lengthy stakeholder identification process.  For reasons of 
confidentiality, the names of the individual representatives for each of the stakeholder 
groups were withheld. However, the stakeholder groups represented are listed below. For 
the purposes of this paper, the key stakeholders are defined as: 
 
• The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality; 
• The Department of Transport; 
• Algoa Bus Company; 
• The Port Elizabeth Private Bus Operators Association; and 
• The local taxi industry. 
 
The primary study took place over the course of approximately one year and consisted of a 
number of separate yet overlapping stages. The first stage involved semi-structured 
interviews through which an in-depth picture of the stakeholder priorities and requirements 
could be compiled. This data was used in the development of a conceptual integration 
model. In the second stage, this model was taken back to the participants through a round of 
focus group discussions in order to gauge the level to which it satisfied their requirements. 
 
In a separate work stream to the above, the observation method was utilised as a primary 
data gathering technique during the fact finding visits by the author to the cities of Bogota 
and Pereira in Colombia, where successful transport integration initiatives have been 
implemented. The findings from the study visit to Colombia served as important inputs into 
the development of an integration model for Nelson Mandela Bay. The data collection 
methods utilised in the primary study can therefore be summarised as the following: 
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• Interviews; 
• A focus group exercise; and 
• Observation. 
 
Each will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
5.3.2 Secondary study 
 
The secondary study consisted of a review of relevant literature in order to answer the sub-
problem “what strategies are revealed in the relevant literature than can assist in the 
development of an integrated public transport entity?” Two generic integration strategies – 
a merger and joint venture strategy – were examined and assessed in terms of their 
suitability for the development of the required solution. The results of this study provided 
an important theoretical framework within which the development of an integration model 
for the transport entities in Nelson Mandela Bay could be approached. 
 
 
 
5.4 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:47) make a distinction between two main research paradigms or 
philosophies. These are referred to as the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
respectively.  Broadly speaking, the positivistic approach is based on the belief that the 
study of human behaviour should be conducted in the same way as studies of the natural 
sciences. Therefore, according to the positivistic approach, the facts of social phenomena 
should be studied with little regard to the subjective views of the individual. Explanations 
are arrived at by establishing causal relationships between variables and linking them to an 
integrated or deductive theory.  
 
In contrast to this, the phenomenological paradigm focuses on understanding human 
behaviour from the participant’s frame of reference. The research methods used under this 
approach are interpretative techniques which seek to describe, translate or otherwise come 
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to terms with the meaning of naturally occurring phenomena in the social world (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003:53). 
 
The table below presents the contrasting features of the positivistic and phenomenological 
research paradigms.  
 
TABLE 5.1 POSITIVISTIC AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PARADIGM CHARACTERISTICS 
Positivistic paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Tends to produce quantitative data Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses large samples Uses small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing Concerned with generating theories 
Data is highly specific and precise Data is rich and subjective 
The location is artificial The location is natural 
Reliability is high Reliability is low 
Validity is low Validity is high 
Generalises from sample to population Generalises from one setting to another 
(Source: Adapted from Collis and Hussey, 2003:55) 
 
Considering the contrasting features of the two paradigms, it becomes apparent that a 
phenomenological research paradigm would be most appropriate to the nature and context 
of this study.  The selection of a phenomenological approach is validated by the following 
characteristics of the study. 
 
The study of the integration process of the transport industry in Nelson Mandela Bay relied 
on qualitative rather than quantitative data. Observation, in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions were the key techniques employed to gather primary data for the study. 
Collis and Hussey (2003:55) state that the use of qualitative data is most often associated 
with the phenomenological research paradigm. 
The sample size in the study was small, as it was limited to key representatives of the main 
stakeholders in the process. The aim was to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
requirements of the stakeholders involved, rather than to conduct statistical analysis. This 
corresponds to the characteristics of a phenomenological research approach, which, 
according to Collis and Hussey (2003:57) places emphasis on the quality and depth of the 
data, the richness of the detail and the nuance of the phenomena being studied. 
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The aim of the research study was to develop a new theory by which the main research 
problem can be solved, rather than testing an existing hypothesis. According to Collis and 
Hussey (2003:56), this approach is a key feature of the phenomenological research 
paradigm. 
 
5.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:55) state that the research paradigm will have a significant 
influence on the research methodology that is selected for the study. The table below 
presents the methodologies associated with the respective paradigms. 
 
TABLE 5.2 METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MAIN PARADIGMS 
Positivistic Phenomenological 
Cross-sectional studies Action Research 
Experimental studies Case Studies 
Longitudinal studies Ethnography 
Surveys Feminist perspective 
 Grounded theory 
 Hermeneutics 
 Participative enquiry 
(Source: Adapted from Collis and Hussey, 2003:60) 
 
The research methodology that was selected for this paper is that of a case study, which 
falls within the phenomenological research paradigm. Specifically, the resolution of the 
main research problem was based on a case study of the Nelson Mandela Bay transport 
operator integration project.  
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:68) define a case study as “an extensive examination of a single 
instance of a phenomenon of interest.”  To corroborate this view, they cite Eisenhardt 
(1989:534) who describes a case study as “a research study which focuses on understanding 
the dynamics present within a single setting”.  
 
The exploration and understanding of context is an issue which receives particular 
emphasis under the case study methodology. Collis and Hussey (2006:68) cite Bonoma 
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(1985:204), who states that a case study “must be constructed to be sensitive to the context 
in which management behaviour takes place” and Yin (1994), who contends that case 
studies do not merely seek to explore selected phenomena, but also aim to understand them 
within a particular context.  
 
The framework that emerges is that of the study of a single phenomenon, within a specific 
context that is examined in order to arrive at a set of findings or conclusions. Given the 
nature of this research study, which focuses exclusively on the integration of public 
transport in Nelson Mandela Bay, a case study approach is deemed to be the most suitable 
research methodology to follow. 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003:68) case studies can be delineated into a number of 
categories, such as descriptive, illustrative, experimental or explanatory case studies. 
However, they are most commonly referred to as exploratory research, used in areas where 
there are few other theories or a deficient body of knowledge. This applies extremely well 
to the Nelson Mandela Bay transport project, as the integration of the bus and taxi 
industries on such as scale has not been successfully attempted in the uniquely South 
African context. 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:69), provide an outline of the main stages of case study research. 
This outline is provided in the table below, together with the corresponding chapter 
references in this paper. 
 
TABLE 5.3   STAGES OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
 Stage Chapter Reference 
   
1 Selecting your case Chapter 1 
2 Preliminary investigations Chapters 2-4 
3 The data stage Chapter 6 
4 The analysis stage Chapter 7 
5 The report stage Chapter 8 
(Source: Adapted from Collis and Hussey, 2003:69) 
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5.6 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
 
The data collection methods used in the case study included documentary analysis, the use 
of interviews, focus groups and observation. Each of these methods will be discussed in 
detail below. 
 
5.6.1 Documentary analysis 
 
This included an overview of the NMBM Public Transport Plan as documented in chapter 
2, the literature study as documented in chapter 3, and an analysis of the presentations by 
Edgar Sandoval from Transmilenio in Bogota, Colombia and Monica Vanegas from 
Megabus in Pereira, Colombia, as documented in chapter 4. 
5.6.2 Interviews 
 
The most important data collection technique utilised during the research study was the 
interview-method. According to Collis and Hussey (2003:167), interviews are associated 
with both phenomenological and positivist methodologies. 
 
Over the course of the study, an extensive consultation process was followed, during which 
all of the main stakeholders were interviewed on more than one occasion in order to obtain 
their views, input and requirements with regard to the creation of an integrated public 
transport entity. It should be pointed out that in each case, duly appointed representatives of 
each of the parties were selected as the points of contact, and their views were deemed as 
appropriately representative of the organisations or groups whom they were mandated to 
speak on behalf of. In the case of the taxi industry, signed letters of authority, mandating 
the elected individuals to represent their respective taxi-associations, were obtained to 
ensure the legitimacy of the stakeholder representatives. Interviews were conducted with 
the following individuals. 
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TABLE 5.4   INTERVIEWEES AND STAKEHOLDERS REPRESENTED 
Stakeholder Representative/s Capacity 
ECDRT Confidential Project Lead 
Representative 
NMBM Confidential Project Manager 
Taxi industry Confidential Chairpersons of the 
Taxi Associations 
Algoa Bus Company Confidential Board Members 
PEPBOA Confidential All Members 
(Source: The author) 
Constructing the interviews 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:168) differentiate between structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews. Structured interviews, with closed questions which have been 
prepared in advance, are associated with a positivistic approach. In contrast, a 
phenomenological research methodology would be inclined to utilise unstructured or semi-
structured interviews containing open-ended questions which have not been fully prepared 
prior to the interview.  
 
For the interviews in this case study, a semi-structured interview approach was deemed 
most appropriate. This can be justified by the fact that the aim of the interview process was 
to gain a detailed understanding of the requirements and expectations of the stakeholder 
groups represented by the respective interviewees. Collis and Hussey (2003:168) state that 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews are appropriate when, amongst other criteria, the 
aim of the method is to “understand the construct that the interviewee uses as a basis for his 
beliefs and opinions about a particular matter or situation.”  Understanding why 
stakeholders set specific conditions for the conceptual integration model was as important 
as understanding what these conditions were. Ultimately, the underlying motivations of the 
stakeholders had to be understood in order to ensure that the suggested solution would meet 
their needs in the long term.  
 
The existence of significant mistrust and apprehension towards the proposed integration – 
particularly in the taxi industry – required a particularly rich communication experience to 
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enable the sharing of important and sometimes closely guarded information. According to 
Collis and Hussey (2003:168), the process of open discovery is one of the main strengths of 
the semi- and unstructured interview methods. It therefore reinforces the suitability of this 
technique in the context of the case study. 
 
It should be pointed out that the phenomenological and positivistic paradigms are merely 
on different ends of a continuum, which stretches from the one extreme towards the other 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003:52). Therefore, although the research study is predominantly 
characterised by a phenomenological approach, certain aspects of a positivistic study were 
incorporated, if necessary, to facilitate the most efficient and accurate gathering of primary 
data.   
Designing questions 
 
When designing a semi-structured interview, the researcher developed the interview 
strategy around the topics and issues that needed to be addressed (Collis and Hussey, 
2003:178) In this case study, the purpose of the interviews was to obtain an understanding 
of the stakeholder requirements that the integration model would have to address. It was 
therefore necessary, to develop questions that would extract this data as accurately as 
possible. In the context of the qualitative nature of this study, and due to the need to gain a 
thorough understanding of the needs of each stakeholder, the interviews consisted largely 
of open ended questions. Where necessary, however, closed questions were utilised if a 
definitive answer to a question was required.  With the above purpose in mind, the 
interviews were designed to address the following key topics: 
 
• The expectations of the interviewee of the outcomes of the integration process; 
• The relationship between the interviewee’s group and the other stakeholders in the 
process; 
• The main challenges, from the interviewee’s perspective, standing in the way of the 
successful completion of the integration process; and 
• The most important issues that the interviewee would like to be addressed in the 
integration process. 
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Semi-structured interview – Identifying stakeholder requirements 
 
With the stated topics serving as a guide, the semi-structured interview was designed to 
incorporate the following core questions: 
 
• Describe the current relationship between your organisation/group and the other 
stakeholders in the local transport industry; 
• What are your expectations with regard to the outcome of the integration process? 
• In your view, how will the integration of the bus and taxi industries in Nelson 
Mandela Bay affect your stakeholder group? 
• What, in your view, are the main challenges that stand in the way of the successful 
integration of the transport operators in Nelson Mandela Bay? 
• What are your minimum requirements from the process? 
• What suggestions (if any) do you have with regard to a preferred integration model? 
and 
• What are the critical issues, from your point of view, that need to be addressed in 
the integration process? 
 
 
The findings of the interviews are presented in the next chapter as a list of key issues that 
required resolution from the point of view of each stakeholder interviewed. 
 
5.6.3 Focus group 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003:166), focus groups are usually associated with 
phenomenological research methodologies. They allow the researcher to gather data 
relating to the feelings and opinions of a group of people who are involved in a common 
situation. Focus groups produce qualitative data. Their value lies in the fact that they can 
provide guidance on important issues that the study should focus on, and can assist in the 
identification of important questions that require resolution.  
 
The focus group technique was utilised for precisely this purpose in the case study. Focus 
groups were utilised at regular intervals throughout the research study whenever interim 
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milestones had to be presented to stakeholders for assessment. The data gathered allowed 
the project team to develop their conceptual model on an interactive basis with the major 
stakeholders, and to manage any expectation gaps that might have developed in the interim. 
The selection of focus group members fell outside the scope of this study, since the 
designated stakeholder representatives automatically served as the members of the focus 
groups. Therefore, this was an externally enforced parameter which had to be adhered to.  
 
 Evaluating response to conceptual integration model 
 
 
The most significant use of the focus group technique revolved around the initial evaluation 
of the draft conceptual model. After the development of an initial hypothesis based on the 
key stakeholder requirements, the proposed integration model was presented to the key 
stakeholders for comment. The feedback obtained from this focus group activity was 
utilised to further develop and refine the final solution that was decided on. The results of 
this process are presented in chapter 7 of the research paper. 
 
5.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
The table below presents the main methods for the analysis of qualitative data. 
 
TABLE 5.5   QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
Quantifying methods Non-quantifying methods 
Informal methods General analytical procedure 
Content analysis Cognitive mapping 
Repertory grid Data displays 
 Grounded theory 
 Quasi-judicial methods 
  
(Source: Collis and Hussey, 2003:254 ) 
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For this research study the quasi-judicial method was selected. According to Bromley 
(1986), as cited by Collis and Hussey (2003:286), this method does not relegate data 
analysis to the end of the research process, but instead allows the researcher to analyse the 
data in a continuous process. During the analysis process, the following questions should be 
considered: 
 
• What is the issue? 
• What other relevant evidence might there be? 
• How else might one make sense of the data? and 
• How were the data obtained? 
 
The quasi-judicial method was deemed to be suitable, based on the context of the case 
study. Due to the qualitative nature of the research, a conclusion could not be arrived at by 
statistical or computer analysis, or a similar process. Instead, a holistic picture gradually 
needed to be constructed, based on a deep understanding of the requirements of the 
stakeholders. This picture could not be a snapshot in time, but instead its construction had 
to be an iterative process of gathering data, analysing it, developing a working model and 
taking it back to the stakeholders for discussions and review.  This feedback then had to be 
used to further refine the process in preparation for the next stakeholder review. Each time 
this process was repeated, a further layer of understanding was built, and the eventual 
solution was systematically constructed. 
 
The quasi-judicial method allows for the documenting of this organic process and the 
logical building of a case to arrive at the final solution to the research problem. 
 
Bromley as cited by Collis and Hussey (2003:287) provides six rules that should be applied 
when utilising the quasi-judicial method of analysis: 
 
• The investigator must report truthfully; 
• The aims and objectives of the investigation must be stated explicitly; 
• The achievement of the aims and objectives must be assessed; 
• The investigator must be properly trained; 
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• The person must be placed in his or her ecological context; and 
• The account must be written in good, plain English. 
 
According to Brown and Canter (1985:243), the researcher’s task is to construct a multi-
perspective account of the particular event he or she is investigating, drawn from the 
explanations given by the primary participants. 
 
Robson (1993), as cited by Collis and Hussey (2003:287) developed Bromley’s rules into a 
framework for the analysis of qualitative case study data. This framework is presented 
below.  
 
1. State the initial problem and issues clearly. 
 
In this case it was the main and sub-research problems, depending on which data was being 
analysed.  
 
2. Collect background information to provide a context in terms of which the problems and 
issues are to be understood. 
 
This was addressed in chapter 2 of this research study, where the contextual overview of 
the transport environment in Nelson Mandela Bay was discussed. The data gathered during 
the fact finding visits to Colombia adds further depth to the context. 
 
3. Put forward prima facie explanations of the problems and issues. 
 
4. Use these explanations to guide the search for additional evidence. If they do not fit the 
available evidence, work out alternative explanations. 
 
Steps 4 and 5 are represented by the interview process that was conducted to gain a 
thorough understanding of the stakeholder challenges and requirements relating to the 
integration process. 
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5. Continue the search for sufficient evidence to eliminate as many of the suggested 
explanations as possible, in the hope that one will account for all of the available evidence 
and be contradicted by none of it.  Evidence may be direct or indirect, but must be 
admissible, relevant and obtained from competent and credible sources. 
 
This step is represented by the in-depth interview process as well as the documentary 
studies of the city’s Public Transport Plan, presentations by officials from international 
cities that have conducted similar projects and the literature review discussed in chapter 3 
of this paper. 
 
6. Closely examine the sources of evidence, as well as the evidence itself. All items should 
be checked for consistency and accuracy. This is analogous to legal cross-examination in 
the case of personal testimony. 
 
The repeated execution of stakeholder interviews served to increase the validity, 
consistency, reliability and accuracy of the data collected. The validity and reliability of the 
data will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
7. Enquire critically into the internal coherence, logic and external validity of the network 
of arguments claiming to settle the issues and solve the problems. 
 
8. Select the most likely interpretation compatible with the evidence 
 
9. Formulating the acceptable explanation usually carries an implication for action which 
has to be worked out. 
 
Steps 7, 8 and 9 are represented by chapter 7 of this paper, in which the results of the data 
gathering exercises are analysed and a conceptual solution to the problem is developed. 
 
10. Prepare an account in the form of a report. It should contribute to “case law” by virtue 
of the general principles employed in explaining the specific case. 
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This entire paper, culminating in the conclusion presented in chapter 8, serves as the report 
representing the research study conducted. 
 
5.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:186), define data as being reliable if another study would obtain 
the same results should the research be repeated. Validity is concerned with the extent to 
which the research data accurately represents the situation that is being studied.  
 
Collis and Hussey (2003:186) identify three common ways of testing the reliability of 
responses to questions in interviews or questionnaires. These are: 
 
• The test re-test method, which requires the researcher to ask the same questions of 
the interviewee at two separate occasions; 
 
• The split-halves method, in which the interview record sheets are split into two 
halves which are compared to one another to determine data correlation; and 
 
• The internal-consistency method, where the researcher determines the inter-item 
correlation between every item in the entire sample. 
 
In this research study, the test re-test method was the most suitable option, due to the fact 
that the study dealt with a relatively small group of key stakeholder representatives over an 
extended period of time. Therefore, the consistency of the answers to common questions 
could be tested on repeated occasions as questions were repeatedly posed to interviewees. 
 
The validity of the data was facilitated by the fact that the interview questions were 
predominantly open ended and allowed the stakeholders to present important issues from 
their point of view. The interview process was therefore designed to reveal the underlying 
motivations behind stakeholder points-of-view, and was flexible enough to allow 
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interviewees to guide the interview towards issues that were most relevant from their 
perspective. This ensured that the primary data gathered from the interviews was both valid 
and relevant to the problem at hand. 
 
5.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter, the research design, data collection techniques and data analysis methods 
were discussed. In the next chapter the results of the empirical study, and the initial 
analysis, according to the quasi-judicial method, will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical study will be presented and discussed. Collis and 
Hussey (2003:297) state that in a phenomenological study it can be very difficult to 
separate the results from the analysis of the data. Ultimately, in a phenomenological as in a 
positivist study, the aim remains to make sense of the data.  
According to Collis and Hussey (2003:300), the use of quotations, illustrations and 
individual episodes can assist in presenting complex qualitative data effectively.  However, 
while diagrams or illustrations can be used for support and clarification, the main emphasis 
of the discussion must remain focused on the text. 
 
In this chapter, the results of the stakeholder interviews will be presented in chronological 
order, in order to gradually build a picture of the data collected. In line with the quasi-
judicial method, the data will be methodically discussed to assist with the analysis that will 
follow in chapter 7. 
 
6.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter of this paper, semi-structured interviews were utilised 
to gather the primary data relating to stakeholder requirements. The questions posed to the 
participants are listed below:  
 
• Describe the current relationship between your organisation/group and the other 
stakeholders in the local transport industry; 
• What are your expectations with regard to the outcome of the integration process? 
• In your view, how will the integration of the bus and taxi industries in Nelson 
Mandela Bay affect your stakeholder group? 
• What, in your view, are the main challenges that stand in the way of the successful 
integration of the transport operators in Nelson Mandela Bay? 
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• What are your minimum requirements from the process? 
• What suggestions (if any) do you have with regard to a preferred integration model? 
and 
• What are the critical issues, from your point of view, that need to be addressed in 
the integration process? 
 
The results of the interviews are presented below. 
6.2.1 Interview – Eastern Cape Department of Roads and Transport 
 
Together with the Nelson Manela Bay Municipality, the ECDRT was the primary driver 
behind the proposed integration process. It was therefore, particularly important to identify 
their requirements relating to a proposed integration model. 
 
 
Interview summary 
 
The ECDRT representative indicated that the Department of Transport expects the process 
to lead to the integration of the bus and taxi industries in the proposed contract area. This 
integration should be as inclusive as possible of the current operators in the affected area. 
His expectation is that a legal entity or entities should be created to represent the operators. 
The number of entities should be based on the business case and the most operationally 
viable solution. 
 
Currently, the Department of Transport has an interim contract with Algoa Bus Company, 
whereby ABC is paid a monthly subsidy in order to provide a limited bus service on 
specific routes to the citizens of the Metropolitan area. The taxi operators currently receive 
no subsidisation from government. The involvement of the Department of Transport is 
limited to the issuing and control of operating licenses to individual taxi operators, which 
provides them with the legal right to transport commuters on individual routes within the 
city.  
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Under the new contract, the ECDRT will withdraw its current subsidy to ABC, and based 
on the new negotiated contract, provide a new, larger subsidy to the integrated entity. Since 
this entity will now include all transport operators, it will mean that both the former bus and 
taxi industries will benefit from government subsidisation, and by extension, so will all the 
commuters on the new system. This issue of equitable subsidisation is an extremely high 
priority of the government with respect to the integration process. 
 
The uplifting and formalisation of the taxi industry is a key aim of the Department of 
Transport in this process. The taxi industry in its current format is ultimately unsustainable 
and operates to the detriment of taxi owners and drivers as well as to the detriment of the 
public that is dependent on the taxi industry for their daily transport needs. The need to 
integrate taxi operators into a scheduled transport service is therefore of paramount 
importance. 
 
A major challenge to the project springs from the distrust between the taxi and bus 
operators. The required merging of the two industries will be made more difficult by the 
lack of co-operation between these two parties. Additionally, the differences within the 
fractured taxi industry itself will require a significant effort to resolve. Designing an entity 
structure that caters for the needs of all parties, while meeting the operational requirements 
of the Department of Transport, will be a challenging task. 
Should a negotiated contract not be possible, the Department of Transport will revert back 
to an open-tender system. This would mean a winner-takes-all situation with losing bidders 
not getting any access to the contract.  
 
The minimum requirements of the Department will be the following: 
• The replacement of the interim contract with ABC with a negotiated contract 
signed with a new transport entity; 
• Inclusion of the majority of the operators in the contract area through a jointly 
agreed solution; 
• The creation of an entity structure that can integrate the bus and taxi industries 
in an operationally viable and mutually acceptable way; and 
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• A business plan which supports the above structure and specifies the size of the 
subsidy that will be required by the new entity. 
 
Suggestions from the ECDRT representative included the following: 
• The requirement for inclusion of current operators refers only to current legal 
operators. In other words, current taxi operators without a valid operating license 
do not need to be included in the new structure; and 
• A thorough stakeholder consultation process should be followed to address the 
serious divisions that exist between operators in the transport industry. 
Key requirements summarised: 
• Integration of the bus and taxi industries; 
• Equitable subsidisation for the bus and taxi industries; 
• Inclusion of only taxi operators with valid, legal operating licenses; 
• Formalisation of the taxi industry; and 
• Skills transfer from bus to taxi industry. 
 
6.2.2 Interview – Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 
 
The Transport Plan Project Manager represented the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in 
the study.  The NMBM are the main drivers of the Broader Transport Initiative, of which 
the integration of the bus and taxi industries formed a sub-project.  
 
Interview summary 
 
The NMBM representative indicated that the integration of the bus and taxi operators was 
expected to be guided by the broader requirements of the Transport Project. A detailed 
overview of this project is provided in chapter 2 of this paper. Since the new transport 
system would be based on a trunk and feeder route system, it requires the integration and 
co-operation of the current bus and taxi operators for operational reasons.  
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The aim of the NMBM is to provide a transport service to the public that is efficient, safe 
and reliable and which can meet these standards on a sustainable basis. This is the primary 
requirement that needs to be met. 
 
The original proposal by the NMBM was that five separate operating entities be established 
– one per geographical contract area in the new system. Each of the five contract areas will 
include both trunk and feeder routes. Trunk routes require bus services and feeder routes 
require mini and midi-bus services. Therefore, each entity will be required to provide both 
trunk and feeder services to the public, according to the demands of the system. In order to 
achieve this, each of the five entities would have to include former bus and taxi operators. 
The five separate contracts would need to provide seamless integration between the 
different areas as well as between the different modes of transport (taxis and buses). 
Ultimately, the Metro wants to see operating entities in place that can contractually be 
bound to provide the required and specified transport services to the citizens of the city. 
Currently the Metro has no relationship with the transport operators in the city, other than 
from a traffic law enforcement perspective. 
 
The inclusion of the taxi industry is a necessary compromise from the Metro’s perspective. 
The taxi industry does not provide any vital or irreplaceable contribution to the new system 
– whether from an asset or experience perspective – as the new service could hypothetically 
be provided in full by the current bus operators in the city. It would require a substantial 
expansion of the current scheduled services, but with sufficient financing the current bus 
operator has the operational and Human Resource capacity to meet the requirements of the 
new contract. However, from a practical and socio-political perspective, the inclusion of the 
taxi industry is imperative for the success of the new system. Exclusion of the taxi 
operators from the contract area would result in significant social resistance to the system. 
Additionally, it will not satisfy the requirements of national government, for whom the 
uplifting and formalisation of the taxi industry is a key priority. 
 
The major challenges from the Metro’s perspective is bridging the gap between the bus and 
taxi industry and marrying the social and operational requirements of the new system. In 
other words, while the social aspects of the problem cannot be ignored, the Metro 
ultimately requires an operationally viable company to sign the negotiated contract for the 
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provision of transport services. This company must therefore, be able to operate on a 
sustainable basis and meet the service requirements of the Municipal transport contract for 
the duration of the contract period. 
If possible, the Metro would prefer to have a measure of competition built into the new 
system, in order to reduce dependence on a specific operator, as well as to serve as an 
incentive to provide high levels of service and performance. This is a difficult goal to 
achieve, since the system will rely on a single bus operator – ABC – for a substantial 
portion of the scheduled bus service assets, experience and infrastructure.  
 
Key requirements summarised: 
 
• Integration of bus and taxi industry; 
• Establishment of viable operating transport entities; 
• Negotiation and signing of five separate contracs to provide transport services to the 
city; and 
• Existence of competition between operators in the new system. 
 
6.2.3 Interview – Algoa Bus Company 
 
Algoa Bus Company was represented by three members of their board of directors. They 
are: 
• The Operations Director; 
• The Financial Director; and 
• The Chief Executive Officer. 
 
Interview summary 
 
Algoa Bus Company currently has an interim contract with the ECDRT to provide limited 
scheduled bus services to the citizens of Nelson Mandela Bay. ABC has no direct 
relationship with the NMBM, and is in a competitive relationship with the taxi industry, in 
that they operate on the same routes and compete for the same customers (commuters.)  
There is currently significant antagonism between ABC and the taxi industry. This is to 
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some extent fuelled by the taxi industry’s grievance at the fact that ABC receives 
government subsidies to operate their bus services to the public. 
 
ABC’s expectations are based on a practical assessment of the situation. The proposed new 
transport contract for Nelson Mandela Bay will replace the current services being provided 
by both bus and taxi operators in the area. ABC’s interim contract with the ECDRT will be 
replaced by a new negotiated contract between the NMBM and a new, integrated transport 
entity. Therefore, if ABC wishes to be part of this contract, they have to integrate with the 
other operators in the city.  Ultimately, if no agreement can be reached, the negotiated 
contract will be cancelled and an open tender approach will be followed instead.  
 
ABC is confident that it can be competitive in its own right in responding to an open 
tender, but will prefer the negotiated tender route in the interest of meeting government 
goals in this regard. ABC is prepared to do this, but only if certain pre-conditions are met in 
the process. These are: 
 
• The retention of the separate legal identity of ABC is a non-negotiable condition for 
their participation in the integration project; 
• Entering the new structure on at least an equal footing with the taxi industry; 
• Retaining the ability to exercise significant and effective management and 
operational control in the new structure; 
• Having an operationally viable structure after integration; and 
• Having a clear exit strategy which will allow ABC to withdraw from the integrated 
structure once the contract period comes to an end. 
 
The new system will radically change ABC’s environment and situation. The proposed 
integration with the taxi industry will require significant changes in their operating and 
management structure. The degree of change will depend on the type of structure selected. 
The contractual situation with the ECDRT will also change completely, since the current 
interim contract to ABC will be replaced by a new negotiated contract which will include 
the taxi industry as well. 
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ABC would prefer it if the bus and taxi industries could be retained as separate entities. A 
situation where the bus company serves the trunk routes and the taxi operators the feeder 
routes would be suitable from their perspective. In their view, the differences in operating 
structure, experience and history between the bus and taxi industries present significant 
challenges to the integration process. 
Key requirements summarised: 
 
• Retention of separate corporate identity: 
• Exit strategy at the end of the contract period; 
• Decision making authority within the integrated entity structure; and 
• Security for current employees in order to ensure the retention of critical skills in 
the face of the change process. 
 
6.2.4 Interview - Taxi industry 
 
The taxi industry was represented by the chairpersons of the taxi associations in Port 
Elizbabeth. For confidentiality reasons, their names are not included in this paper. 
 
Interview summary 
 
The taxi industry consists of approximately 2000-2500 independent operators affiliated to 
10 separate taxi associations.  
 
The taxi operators expect to gain access to a major share of the bus industry through the 
integration project. They feel that they have historically been treated unfairly due to the fact 
that they carry approximately 70% of passengers in the area without receiving any 
subsidies from government. The taxi industry has therefore, needed to support itself while 
the bus operator has been receiving a subsidy from government for years. They do not want 
to be limited to feeder routes only in the new system, and are opposed to any idea which 
will limit them to feeder operations while giving the bus company exclusive access to trunk 
routes.  
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The taxi operators wish to become formal transport operators and expect government to 
provide the support to make this achieveable.  The taxi industry also expects government to 
include as many of the current operators as possible in the new system. The actual 
preference is that ALL current operators be included, but that will depend on negotiations. 
The taxi industry further expects that operators will be compensated at least as much on a 
monthly basis under the new system, as they are currently earning. Current earnings of taxi 
operators vary from case to case. 
 
The taxi industry is concerned about what will happen to employees who are not taxi 
owners, such as drivers. They should be provided for under the new system. 
 
It is important that the issue of vehicles be addressed. The industry insists that their current 
vehicles should be purchased by the new integrated entity or entities, in order to relieve 
current owners of the burden of repaying installments on financed vehicles that will no 
longer be operating for them. 
 
The taxi industry would want at least an equal share in any proposed integrated entity 
structure and would want to be able to be involved in the management and operational 
control of the new entities. The number of operating entities is not a concern to the taxi 
industry as long as they have significant ownership in all of them.  
 
Key challenges from their perspective are the lack of cooperation between the bus and taxi 
industries, the lack of skills in the taxi industry, and the lack of capital available to buy into 
any proposed integrated structure. Skills development is therefore a high priority for the 
industry. 
 
Key requirements summarised: 
 
• Fair access to government subsidisation; 
• Inclusion of as many taxi operators as possible; 
• Access for taxi operators to become bus operators; 
• Guaranteed monthly income for each taxi operator in excess of what they currently 
earn; 
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• Management involvement in new structure; and 
• Transfer of skills to the taxi industry. 
 
6.2.5 Interview – Port Elizabeth Private Bus Owners Association 
 
Interview summary 
 
PEPBOA is a smaller association of independent bus operators within the Metropolitan 
area. It is not represented by a separate legal entity. Instead, the individual owners run their 
operations independently.  
 
PEPBOA does not possess any operating licenses. Instead, its members own permits, and 
conduct mostly long distance coach services. Therefore, they will not be required to 
relinquish any operating licenses to the new integrated operating structure. 
 
PEPBOA has no affiliation with the other operators in the bus and taxi industry and do not 
receive any subsidies from government. However, the members of PEPBOA expect to 
receive their fair share out of the new system. They feel that they have been unfairly 
excluded from access to subsidies in the past, and see the new structure as an opportunity to 
correct this imbalance.  
 
The members of PEPBOA are in favour of the new system, provided they share in the 
ownership of the new entity or entities. Thus, they are open to negotiations with the other 
operators, as long as their interests are protected.  
 
Key requirements summarised: 
 
• Fair access to government subsidisation; and 
• Inclusion of all members of PEPBOA in the integrated transport entity. 
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6.3 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
The findings of the first round of interviews allowed the project team to develop a detailed 
picture of the key issues to be addressed from the point of view of each of the main parties 
involved in the integration project. In order to analyse the responses obtained from the 
interviewees, the key issues were extracted and summarised in a tabular format. The table 
of issues is provided below, together with the stakeholders who raised them.   
 
 
TABLE 6.1 LIST OF COMBINED STAKEHOLDER REQUIREMENTS 
Issue nr Requirement description Stakeholder 
1 Integration of bus and taxi industry ECDRT 
2 Formalisation and uplifting of the taxi 
industry 
ECDRT/Taxi Industry/NMBM 
3 Inclusion of majority of transport 
operators 
ECDRT/NMBM/Taxi 
Industry/PEPBOA 
4 Transfer of skills from the bus to the 
taxi industry 
ECDRT/Taxi Industry 
5 Provision of a reliable, safe and efficient 
transport service to the public 
NMBM/ECDRT 
6 Retention of separate identity ABC 
7 Exit strategy at conclusion of contract ABC 
8 Competition within the system NMBM 
9 Fair distribution of routes Taxi Industry 
10 Fair access to subsidisation Taxi Industry/PEPBOA 
11 Acceptable shareholding and profit 
sharing 
Taxi Industry/ABC/PEPBOA 
12 Management and decision-making 
control in the new structure 
ABC/Taxi Industry 
13 Creation of five separate transport 
contracts – one per geographical area in 
the PTP 
NMBM 
14 Speed and ease of implementation NMBM 
15 Minimum reliance on subsidies ECDRT/NMBM 
16 Access to external financing ECDRT/NMBM 
17 Ease of termination at end of contract ABC/NMBM 
18 Phasing in implementation in separate 
contract areas 
NMBM 
19 Seamless, integrated system NMBM 
20 Long term sustainability NMBM/ECDRT 
(Source: The author) 
 
The listed stakeholder requirements provided a framework of conditions upon which the 
new operating entity structure had to be constructed. The integration model that was 
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developed could only solve the main problem if it addressed these issues and was thereby 
ultimately acceptable to each of the participating stakeholder groups. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 In this chapter the results of the interviews with the main stakeholders were presented and 
discussed. As per the quasi-judicial method, the results were analysed, and prima facie 
results arrived at.  In the next chapter, the primary and secondary data gathered during the 
study will be integrated, and based on a detailed analysis of the results,  a recommended 
solution to the main problem of the research study will be developed.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATION MODEL 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The stakeholder interviews discussed in chapter 6 provided the data needed to generate the 
criteria which the new entity structure should adhere to.  In this chapter, the data collected 
in the preceding chapters will be analysed in order to develop a number of entity structures 
for consideration. The options will be evaluated according to the quasi-judicial method of 
analysis and the most suitable option will be recommended. The presentation of this option 
to the transport stakeholders will be documented, and based on the feedback obtained, the 
final integration model for the operators in the transport industry will be developed. 
 
7.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SCENARIOS 
 
Based on an analysis of the stakeholder requirements, various integration options were 
developed as possible solutions to the main problem. Although six different options are 
discussed below, each can be categorised as a version of either a merger or a joint venture 
strategy as described by the literature study in chapter 3.  
 
The two merger options listed below entail the combination of all existing entities into 
either a single new organisation or five smaller organisations (one per contract area). The 
four types of joint venture strategy listed below propose that the existing, separate identities 
of operators be retained, while a new joint venture entity, entities or contracts are created to 
fulfill the requirements of the new transport contract. 
 
The justification behind each of these options is presented below. 
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7.2.1 One merger between the bus and taxi industries 
 
FIGURE 7.1 MERGER BETWEEN BUS AND TAXI INDUSTRIES 
 
(Source: The author) 
 
This was the most obvious option that presented itself based on the requirements of the 
ECDRT. A full merger between the bus companies and the taxi operators would achieve 
complete integration between the bus and taxi industries. The newly merged entity could 
then enter into five separate contracts – one per contract area – as required by the NMBM. 
 
Characteristics: 
 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and individual taxi associations merge into one newly 
formed company; 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and taxi associations cease to exist as separate entities; 
• The merged entity concludes five geographically based transport agreements with 
the NMBM; and 
• The entire service is provided by the merged entity. 
 
 
 
 
 
ABC PEPBOA TAXI 
COMPANY 
NMBM 
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7.2.2 Five merged companies – one per contract area 
 
FIGURE 7.2 FIVE MERGED COMPANIES 
 
(Source: The author) 
 
The second alternative was to create a separate merged entity for each of the five contract 
areas. This would meet the integration criteria from government, while at the same time 
providing room for competition within the system, and thereby reducing the city’s reliance 
on a single operator for the provision of public transport. In this scenario the taxi operators 
can be amalgamated into five groups while ABC is dissolved into five smaller bus entities. 
Each bus entity would then merge with one of the five taxi groups, to form a new, merged 
transport entity which can enter into one of the five contracts with the NMBM, 
corresponding to one of the five geographical areas in the overall system. This option, 
while possible, will be significantly more complicated, costly and time consuming than the 
single merger, as ABC would have to be divided into five separate, yet functional, smaller 
entities before the integration can take place.  
 
Characteristics: 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and the individual taxi associations merge into five 
separate, new companies;  
• ABC,  PEPBOA members and taxi associations cease to exist; 
• The merged entities conclude five separate transport agreements with the NMBM– 
one per geographical area; and 
• The entire service is provided by the merged entities. 
ABC PEPBOA  TAXI ASS  
Merged 
Company 1 
NMBM 
Merged 
Company 2 
Merged 
Company 3 
Merged 
Company 4 
Merged 
Company 5 
 94 
7.2.3   One joint-venture company 
 
FIGURE 7.3 ONE JOINT VENTURE COMPANY 
 
(Source: The author) 
 
Despite the initial appeal of a merger, some of the stakeholder requirements would not be 
satisfied by this strategy. In particular, ABC raised two issues which cannot, at first glance, 
be adequately accommodated in a total merger between the two industries. The first is the 
requirement that they retain their separate identity after the integration process. This is 
problematic, since the basic premise of a merger, as defined in chapter 3, is the integration 
of two previously independent entities into a single, new company.  
 
Secondly, ABC expressed their need for a sound exit strategy at the end of the initial 
contract period.  They want the ability to withdraw from the integrated structure after the 
initial negotiated contract and pursue their own business interests should they wish to. Once 
again, a merger strategy would leave them with little room to extricate themselves from the 
new company at a later stage.  
 
Based on these requirements, another integration strategy would have to be devised to cater 
to these requirements. As discussed in the literature study in chapter 3, a joint venture 
between ABC and the taxi industry would provide a suitable alternative to satisfy a need for 
retained independence and a separate identity. In this case, ABC and the taxi industry 
would be joint owners of a new entity, which could then contractually engage with the 
NMBM as required. In this way, each would retain their separate identities, while still 
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providing an integrated entity to enter into the transport contracts with the NMBM. The 
joint venture company would then sign five, separate contracts with the NMBM, 
corresponding to each of the five geographical areas within the proposed system. 
 
Characteristics: 
 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and individual taxi association members retain their 
respective identities; 
• The parties create a new legal entity for purposes of the envisaged public transport 
service, but also retain their individual  identities; 
• The new entity  concludes five transport contracts with the NMBM to provide the 
entire service; 
• Each of the parties will transfer or lease assets to the new company (e.g. vehicles, 
workshops etc.); and 
• It is likely that the taxi industry might need to be formalised into a legal entity 
which will then become a shareholder in the joint venture company. 
 
7.2.4 Five joint-venture companies – one per contract area 
 
 
FIGURE 7.4   FIVE JOINT VENTURE COMPANIES 
 
(Source: The author) 
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If a joint venture strategy was decided on, then, as in the case of a merger strategy, the 
option of five, separate joint venture companies – one per contract area – could be 
considered. However, an important distinction between this option and that of the five 
merged companies is that in this case, ABC will not need to be dissolved. Therefore, while 
the taxi operators would be split into five different groups, ABC would be a joint venture 
partner in each of the five joint venture companies. This meets the requirement of ABC to 
retain their current identity. However, this would defeat the purpose of achieving 
competition between the five operators, as approximately 50% of each of the companies 
would be owned by ABC. 
 
Characteristics: 
 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and individual taxi association members retain their 
respective identities; 
• A maximum of five new companies are created (i.e. one for each of the proposed 
geographical areas) which will ultimately contract with the NMBM to provide the 
public transport service;  
• The shareholders in a company will contribute assets to the new company (e.g. 
vehicles, workshops etc.); 
• The shareholders of the companies will depend on the operational requirements of 
the particular geographical area; 
• It might mean that an existing transport entity will be a shareholder in more than 
one of the new entities; 
• The shareholders of the various companies could be individual operators, certain 
taxi associations or a single entity representing the entire taxi industry; and 
• The less lucrative geographical areas could be grouped together thereby reducing 
the number of companies. 
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7.2.5 One joint-venture contract between the bus and taxi industry 
 
 
FIGURE 7.5   ONE  JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT 
 
(Source: The author) 
 
 
As stated by Herzfeld (1990:35), in chapter 3 of this research study, the legal structure of a 
joint venture could be purely contractual in nature. In such a case, a joint venture entity is 
not created. Instead, a contractual agreement is simply entered into by the joint venture 
partners, focused specifically on responding to the requirements of the transport contract of 
the NMBM. This option would provide for full co-operation between the bus and taxi 
industry, without necessitating the creation of a separate legal entity that is jointly owned 
by the parties. It is the simplest and least challenging option, but it provides for a lower 
level of integration than the other options discussed thus far. 
 
Characteristics: 
 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and individual taxi association members (the parties) 
retain their respective identities; 
• The parties conclude a joint venture agreement with each other to provide the 
service to the entire area; 
• The joint venture agreement provides for the allocation of routes and services; use 
of assets; profit sharing etc.; and 
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• The parties in their respective capacities as joint venture partners conclude five 
separate service level agreements with the NMBM. 
7.2.6 Five joint-venture contracts – one per contract area 
 
FIGURE 7.6 FIVE JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS 
 
(Source: The author) 
 
As in the case of a merger and a joint venture company, the joint venture contract can also 
be divided into five, meaning that a separate contract would be signed between a group of 
taxi operators, ABC and PEPBOA for providing transport services in each of the five 
contract areas. 
 
Characteristics: 
 
• ABC, PEPBOA members and individual taxi association members (the parties) 
retain their respective identities; 
• A maximum of five separate transport contracts are concluded; 
• The parties to the various contracts will depend on the operational requirements 
within a specific geographical area; 
• The parties have an opportunity to work together before creating a legal entity; 
• It may mean that one or more of the existing public transport entities will be a party 
to more than one of the five contracts; 
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• The contract provides for the allocation of routes and services; use of assets; profit 
sharing etc.; 
• The parties to the contracts conclude transport agreements with the NMBM; and 
• The parties to the various contracts could be individual operators, certain taxi 
associations or a single entity representing the entire taxi industry. 
 
7.3 SELECTION OF THE MOST SUITABLE OPTION  
 
In order to make an informed decision between these strategies, the advantages and 
disadvantages of each option had to be analytically evaluated and compared. The following 
data served as inputs into the analysis: 
 
• A review of relevant literature on integration strategies between organisations in 
general. This literature review was discussed in chapter 3; and  
• A comparison of integration strategies based on the empirical data gathered in the 
case study. This includes the results of the stakeholder interviews discussed in the 
chapter 6 as well as the results of the study visit undertaken to Colombia, as 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 
The results of the above research were analysed, and based on the outcomes a 
recommended integration strategy was selected. 
7.3.1 Comparison of options based on literature study 
 
As indicated in the conclusion of chapter 3, the results of the literature study revealed that a 
joint venture strategy was more suitable for the Nelson Mandela Bay case than a merger 
strategy. 
7.3.2 Comparison of options based on primary data gathered 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003:253), the analysis of qualitative data presents 
significant challenges to the researcher.  Where possible, they suggest that the data be 
converted to a quantitative format, to assist in interpreting it. To facilitate this process, the 
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list of integration options were converted into a decision matrix populated with the key 
criteria generated by the stakeholder interview process presented in chapter 6. It is 
important to note that only the criteria that would be influenced by the choice of integration 
option were included in this exercise. Each option was then evaluated to determine the 
degree to which it satisfied each requirement, on a level of 1-5. In this way a quantitative 
score could be allocated to what was essentially qualitative data.  
 
It should be pointed out that the awarding of scores was inherently a subjective process, as 
the score out of 5 was based on the opinion of the evaluating panel. However, this 
weakness was mitigated by the fact that the panel of evaluators consisted of the consulting 
project team that had intimate involvement in the entire stakeholder consultation process.  
These individuals possessed the required perspective of neutrality to judge the issues on 
their individual merit, and had the sole motive of selecting the best possible integration 
strategy to achieve the goals of the project. This was, after all, what they had been 
contracted for. 
 
TABLE 7.1  SCORE ALLOCATIONS 
Not at all 0 
Very low 1 
Low 2 
Medium 3 
High 4 
Very High 5 
 
In addition to the simple scoring system that was used, each of the criteria was also 
evaluated from a wider perspective. In this regard, the stakeholder requirements were 
divided between negotiable and non-negotiable issues.   Non-negotiable criteria were issues 
of such importance that failure to address them would prevent any agreement between 
stakeholders from being reached. Therefore, meeting these requirements was considered to 
be mandatory. The remaining criteria were requirements that, if successfully addressed, 
would add weight to a specific option, but would not in isolation cause the agreement to fail 
if not addressed. This allowed the satisfaction of non-negotiable requirements to take 
precedence over less important issues, and thereby ensured that the decision-making 
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process remained aligned with the reality of the situation on the ground. This aspect could 
not be addressed from a numerical scoring perspective, but was instead considered 
subsequent to the scoring exercise, when the issues were evaluated holistically and from an 
integrated project perspective. 
 
The 20 criteria considered are listed below, together with a discussion of how well each of 
the integration options addressed each respective issue. As can be seen, the criteria are 
based on the findings of the stakeholder consultation process as documented in section 6.3. 
 
Criterion 1: Integration of the existing operators 
 
Analysis: 
The merger options present the highest level of integration, with the previous identities of 
the participants being fully merged into and replaced by the new entity. The joint venture 
options do not take the integration to such a high level, but nevertheless, the creation of a 
new jointly owned company or companies will still ensure the full integration of the two 
industries on a practical level. The only difference will be the retention of separate 
identities for the participants. The joint venture contract options provide for the least degree 
of integration, as the integration will merely be on a contractual level, with no new entity 
being created which will integrate the operations of the participants. 
 
TABLE 7.2 CRITERION 1 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 5 4 4 1 1 
 
Criterion 2:  Formalisation and  upliftment of the existing taxi industry 
 
Analysis: 
The single merger and single joint venture company options provide for the complete 
formalisation of the taxi industry. In these scenarios, the taxi industry becomes a full 
participant in a high profile, transport company that provides scheduled transport services 
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to the residents of an entire city. Under the multiple merger and multiple joint venture 
company options, this is still achieved, if on a smaller scale. Furthermore, the smaller 
nature of the entities makes it more likely that some of the taxi operators may not form a 
viable operating entity, or not achieve sufficient skills transfer from the bus industry to 
adapt to the professional nature of the new system. This issue was touched on in the 
discussion on the best scenario for a full transfer of skills to the taxi industry. Under the 
joint venture contract options, the taxi industry will be left largely to their own devices, 
with only the minimum formalisation provided as per the requirement of the contract. The 
low level of integration with the bus industry will mean that they are designated largely to 
providing feeder services to the system, without getting significant access to the bus 
industry. As the bus portion of the fleet will gradually grow as the city grows, at the 
expense of minibuses, the taxi industry will be at a disadvantage in the long run, and the 
uplifting goals of the government will not be achieved. 
 
TABLE 7.3 CRITERION 2 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 4 5 3 1 1 
 
Criterion 3: Inclusion of the majority of the existing public transport operators 
 
 
Analysis: 
All of the options address this requirement fully. 
 
TABLE 7.4 CRITERION 3 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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Criterion 4: Skills transfer between the transport operators 
 
Analysis: 
Essentially, this question is tied very closely to the level of integration that is achieved. The 
greater the integration, the greater the necessity for a transfer of skills from the bus to the 
taxi industry will be. It will be a business imperative, as the fortunes of both participants 
will be intricately tied together. 
In both merger and joint venture entity options, a transfer of skills will be essential. In the 
case of the joint venture contracts, the bus and taxi industries will be less closely integrated, 
and less dependent on one another. While a transfer of skills is not discouraged by these 
options, there is less urgency for it to take place. Nevertheless, all of the options can be 
constructed to include a transfer of skills to some degree. The strong integration options 
simply address this issue more strongly. Additionally, the single merger and single joint 
venture company options have the added benefit of greater economies of scale, where the 
skills transfer costs can be shared across the entire firm, and thereby be conducted more 
efficiently and at a lower cost to the overall operation.  
 
TABLE 7.5 CRITERION 4 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 4 5 4 2 1 
 
Criterion 5: Efficiency at providing the envisaged service 
 
Analysis: 
The single merger and single joint venture options offer a high degree of efficiency in terms 
of performing the primary functions of the proposed operation. The ability to manage the 
entire service by way of a central management function greatly enhances the likely 
efficiency of the entity. In contrast, the options which require the use of multiple entities 
which operate at varying degrees of independence from one another are inherently less 
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efficient in nature. In chapter 3, one of the key benefits of mergers was defined as the 
ability to reduce costs. The need for one management structure as opposed to five allows 
for the elimination of extensive duplication costs, and enables the smoother running of 
operations. The joint venture contract options allow for the least degree of efficiency, as no 
central planning function is provided for. Instead, the co-operation between the two 
partners will be purely on a contractual basis, with no merged management structure being 
created. The joint venture company option would entail the creation of an entirely new 
management structure for the new entity, and therefore retain the efficiency benefits 
associated with a full merger. 
 
TABLE 7.6 CRITERION 5 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 3 5 3 1 1 
 
Criterion 6: Retention of the separate identities of the operators 
 
Analysis: 
This was a non-negotiable issue from the point of view of ABC.  As stated already, the 
merger strategies are not able to meet this requirement at all.  In contrast, the various forms 
of joint venture – whether it is via a new entity or simply on a contractual basis – allow for 
the complete satisfaction of this need. Each party to the joint venture will be able to operate 
additional, separate business activities, outside of the joint transport contract, while still 
meeting the integration requirements of the contract. 
 
TABLE 7.7 CRITERION 6 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 0 0 5 5 5 5 
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Criterion 7: Viable exit strategy for the partners at the end of the contract period 
 
Analysis: 
Once a merger has taken place, the previous identities of the participants no longer exist. 
For either party to extract their assets at some point in the future would be extremely 
complicated, and unlikely to be viable. The joint venture options make it quite simple for 
the participants to withdraw from the integrated structure after the completion of the 
transport contract. In the case of the five joint venture companies, this might be more 
difficult on the side of the taxi industry. If five separate taxi companies were originally 
created to enter into the five joint venture contracts, it may well be that upon withdrawing 
from the contract, some of these taxi companies will not be in a viable position to continue 
operations on their own. Therefore, the single joint venture company option would be more 
beneficial in this respect for all parties involved. 
 
TABLE 7.8 CRITERION 7 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 0 0 5 4 5 5 
 
Criterion 8: Competition within the local transport industry 
 
Analysis: 
The single merger, single joint venture company and single joint venture contract options 
provide no room for competition within the system, as all services will be provided by the 
same group of operators. The “five separate mergers” option provides for the greatest 
degree of competition, as each of the five contract areas will be serviced by a different, 
competing company. The Metro will therefore, be able to monitor and encourage 
competition between these companies to improve service levels as well as to reduce 
reliance on a single entity. In the case of five joint venture companies, the real level of 
competition is somewhat reduced, since each of the five companies will be partly owned by 
ABC. Nevertheless, the degree of competition will still be higher than in the cases where 
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only a single new company is created. The same applies to the case of the five joint venture 
contracts, as ABC will be one party to the contract in all five cases. 
 
TABLE 7.9 CRITERION 8 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 0 5 0 3 0 3 
 
Criterion 9: Equitable distribution of routes 
 
Analysis: 
The single merger and single joint venture options provide for a fully equitable distribution 
of routes by default, as all routes will be allocated to a single new entity, of which both 
participants are joint owners. In the case of the five merged or joint venture companies, this 
issue becomes more problematic, as the entities will each be allocated one of the five 
geographical areas in the transport contract, some of which may be more lucrative than 
others. In the case of the five joint venture companies, it would not affect ABC, as they 
would be joint owners of all five companies, but it would affect the respective taxi 
associations. This could lead to conflict and would be somewhat complicated to resolve. In 
the case of the contractual joint ventures options, the distribution of routes could be 
contractually divided, based on an agreement between the participants, although this would 
be a significantly more complicated goal to achieve equitably.  
 
Furthermore, under the contractual joint venture options the taxi industry is more likely to 
be limited to operating on the feeder routes while the bus operators would service the trunk 
routes. Therefore, a key goal of the taxi industry – namely access to bus operations – would 
not be fulfilled in a joint venture contract situation.  
 
TABLE 7.10 CRITERION 9 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 2 5 3 2 1 
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Criterion 10: Equitable access to subsidisation 
 
Analysis: 
Equitable subsidisation would be achieved in exactly the same way as the division of 
routes. Therefore, the performance of each of the six options would be identical to that in 
the previous question. 
 
TABLE 7.11 CRITERION 10 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 2 5 3 3 3 
 
Criterion 11: Acceptable profit sharing mechanism 
 
Analysis: 
In all the options that entail the creation of a company or companies, distribution of profits 
will naturally be via the payment of dividends to shareholders. In the cases involving joint 
venture contracts, the remuneration of participants will be contractually agreed, based on 
the services and assets that each partner will be contributing to the contract. Therefore, all 
options score equally in this regard. 
 
TABLE 7.12 CRITERION 11 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
Criterion 12: Inclusion of the existing public transport operators at decision-making 
level 
 
Analysis: 
All five options addressed this requirement. However, the more centralised integration 
strategies provided a greater degree of management decision-making and control over the 
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entire operation than did the options that divided the system into multiple smaller 
operations. Nevertheless, none of the options were unable to meet the stakeholder 
requirements in this regard. 
 
TABLE 7.13 CRITERION 12 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 4 5 4 4 4 
 
Criterion 13: Creation of five separate contracts – one per geographical contract area 
 
Analysis: 
All of the options will meet this requirement. 
 
TABLE 7.14 CRITERION 13 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
Criterion 14: Simplicity and speed of implementation 
 
Analysis: 
The joint venture contract options best meet this criterion. Contractual agreements will be 
less complicated and less time consuming to draw up than the creation of new companies, 
or the complete merging of independent operators. The joint venture companies will be the 
second-most favourable in this respect, as they do not entail the dissolution of the current 
organisational structure of ABC with that of the independent taxi operators. Finally, the full 
merger options would be the most difficult and time consuming activities to carry out, as a 
totally new company or companies would have to be created by integrating the current 
operations of the bus and taxi industries. 
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TABLE 7.15 CRITERION 14 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 1 1 3 2 5 5 
 
Criterion 15: Self-sustainability and minimisation of reliance on Government 
subsidisation 
 
Analysis: 
The single merger and single joint venture company options would be more sustainable 
than the creation of multiple companies – either through mergers or joint ventures. The 
duplication of activities and structures in the latter cases will result in significantly higher 
costs which will have to be paid for through increased government subsidies. The joint 
venture contract options would be the least reliant on government subsidies, as no new 
structures or positions would have to be created, and very little integration would have to 
take place.  
 
TABLE 7.16 CRITERION 15 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 2 1 3 2 5 4 
 
Criterion 16: Promoting access to external funding 
 
Analysis: 
All things being equal, the single merger and joint venture company options would be more 
efficient and cost-effective than the creation of multiple companies. Coupled with the 
guaranteed contract for the provision of public transport for a fixed-term period, access to 
financing from banking institutions should be relatively easy to obtain. This probability 
would be greatly enhanced by the fact that the companies would be built around the core 
experience and track record of the ABC, with years of experience in operating as a formal 
bus company. 
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In contrast, the joint venture contract options would make it more difficulty for the taxi 
operators to obtain financing, as many operators have bad credit records, and they have no 
experience in managing large scale organisations. 
 
TABLE 7.17 CRITERION 16 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 3 5 3 2 1 
 
Criterion 17:  Ease of termination at conclusion of contract period 
 
Analysis: 
The merger options would be very difficult to dissolve after the contract period comes to an 
end, as the former operators would be bound together in a newly integrated entity or entities 
with a single legal identity. The single joint venture company would be far simpler to 
terminate, as the dissolution of the joint venture company would be a simple matter of 
agreement between the participants. Theoretically, the same should hold true for the 
separate joint venture companies option. However, due to their smaller size, it may well be 
that the practical consequences of such a dissolution would be that some the taxi companies 
may not be able to continue operations independently. The dissolution of the joint venture 
companies may therefore not be as feasible from their perspective. The joint venture 
contract options would be the easiest to dissolve, since the contracts would simply be 
concluded when the time comes. 
 
TABLE 7.18 CRITERION 17 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 0 0 4 3 5 5 
 
 111 
 
Criterion 18: Phased implementation of the new public transport system 
 
Analysis: 
All of the options considered would be able to allow for the phased implementation of the 
system on a geographical basis. In the single merger and single joint venture company 
scenarios, each new geographical area would merely be incorporated into the operations of 
the company as and when required. Since all operators were shareholders in the company, 
this would not present any problems. In the cases of five mergers and five joint venture 
companies, each respective company would simply become operational as and when the 
applicable geographical contract area became operational in the system. Under the 
contractual joint venture scenarios, the details of the phased implementation would merely 
have to be agreed between the contracting parties.  
 
TABLE 7.19 CRITERION 18 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
Criterion 19: Seamless integrated public transport system 
 
Analysis: 
Although all six options will provide for a degree of integration, the single merger and 
single joint venture company options score highest in this regard. Under these options, the 
operations will be centrally managed as a single system, and all services will be provided 
by the same company. Under the geographically based options, each regional contract will 
be operated by a separate entity, and under the contractual options, even the geographical 
contracts will be operated by separate organisations who are merely co-operating under a 
contractual arrangement. 
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TABLE 7.20 CRITERION 19 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 5 3 5 3 2 1 
 
Criterion 20 Overall viable, sustainable and profitable operation in the long run 
 
Analysis: 
The merger options present viability concerns, due to the lack of willingness of the major 
bus operator to fully merge its identity with the taxi industry. The joint venture contract 
options present sustainability concerns due to the fact that no new entity will be created. 
The operators will therefore remain divided and separated, with a minimum of skills 
transfer and joint decision-making taking place. The lack of a new entity will also hamper 
efforts to secure external funding from financiers.  The option of creating five joint venture 
companies presents profitability concerns, as the duplication of functions in five separate 
companies would entail significantly higher costs. From a viability, sustainability and 
profitability perspective, the single joint venture company presents the highest likelihood of 
success. 
 
TABLE 7.21 CRITERION 20 SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 1 1 4 1 1 1 
 
7.3.3 Findings of the analytical exercise 
 
The summarised results of the decision matrix are presented in the table below. The 
complete decision matrix, containing the full scoring exercise is included in Appendix D. 
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TABLE 7.22 TOTAL SCORES 
Strategy Merger 5 Mergers JV 
Company 
5 JV 
Companies 
JV 
Contract 
5 JV 
Contracts 
Score 69 58 88 70 64 62 
 
 
Independent of the complete scoring exercise, a holistic assessment of the stakeholder 
requirements reveals that certain options do not adhere to the non-negotiable requirements 
raised by various stakeholders. 
 
It was very clear from the interview with ABC that they would never accept any form of 
merger which would see them lose their individual identity. This viewpoint was bolstered 
by the findings of the literature study, which identified incompatibility of participants and 
differences in organisational culture as severe causes for concern when considering a 
merger strategy. Based on the conclusions from the literature study, a merger between two 
such different groups with a history of antagonism and distrust would be fraught with risk, 
and highly unlikely to succeed. Therefore, both merger options were effectively eliminated 
since they do not adhere to this requirement.  
 
Similarly, the integration requirements of government meant that a simple contractual joint 
venture between the bus and taxi industries was unlikely to lead to the level of integration 
and skills transfer that is one of the highest priorities of the ECDRT and the NMBM in this 
exercise. Furthermore, such a contractual arrangement would effectively limit each party to 
their current sphere of operations, as no new entity structure would be created to up-skill 
the taxi industry into becoming bus operators. This meant that a key requirement of the taxi 
industry – namely that they do not wish to be limited to being minibus operators only – 
would not be met by this option.  
 
The above factors meant that only the joint venture company options remained as viable 
solutions. The decision between a single joint venture entity and five separate joint venture 
entities was resolved by the practical and cost related requirements of the case study. The 
duplication of costs that would result from the creation of multiple joint venture entities, 
coupled with the reduced level of integration and central planning that this would bring 
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about, ultimately outweighed the valid concerns surrounding the lack of competition in the 
system. Furthermore, given the fact that ABC would be joint owners in each of the 
proposed five joint venture entities in any case, the five entities option would not 
significantly increase the level of competition that would exist in reality. 
 
In the end, the fact that the single joint venture entity option achieved the highest overall 
score on the decision matrix was merely a reflection of the practical and logical 
requirements of the situation.  The winning score served as a supporting factor in the 
selection of this option, which is ultimately superior due to the fact that it meets the key 
non-negotiable requirements that are integral to achieving stakeholder buy-in into the 
process. 
 
7.4 FEEDBACK FROM THE FOCUS GROUP 
 
 
As required by the quasi-judicial data analysis methodology, it is necessary to review the 
method by which the above solution was arrived at from a logical and factual perspective 
before proceeding further. In order to ensure that this model truly meets the requirements as 
stated by the stakeholders, it was necessary to obtain a second round of input from 
stakeholders, based on the interim recommendation that had been arrived at. 
 
In March 2008, the proposed entity structure was presented to the key stakeholders for 
commentary.  The results of this focus group session were as follows: 
 
7.4.1 ECDRT 
 
The ECDRT representative accepted the proposed structure, while adding the following 
comments: 
 
• He was still in favour of a full merger, but was willing to accept the joint venture as 
a compromise solution; and 
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• He required a detailed financial plan in order to see the subsidy that will be required 
by the new system. 
 
7.4.2 NMBM 
 
The NMBM representatives accepted the proposal, based on the following conditions: 
• That five separate contracts – one for each geographical area – still be signed with 
the joint venture entity; 
• That the financial implications of the structure be presented by way of a detailed 
financial plan, detailing the required subsidy that will be necessary to support the 
system; 
• That the operators find the structure acceptable; 
• They were somewhat concerned about the lack of competition in the proposed 
structure, but were willing to accept it in exchange for greater cost-efficiency; and 
• That methods of obtaining financing for the new entity (loan finance from banking 
institutions) be explored. 
 
7.4.3  ABC 
 
The proposed structure was deemed acceptable in principle, with the following conditions: 
• That the shareholding percentage distribution be resolved; 
• That the management structure of the new entity be clearly defined; 
• That a clear decision-making mechanism be created at board level to avoid 
deadlocks and ensure efficient and smooth decision-making by the directors of the 
company; and 
• That the distribution of profits be clearly defined. 
 
7.4.4  Taxi industry 
 
The representatives of the taxi industry expressed cautious acceptance of the proposed 
structure, based on the following conditions: 
• That the shareholding percentage distribution be resolved; 
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• That the taxi industry is assisted in creating a taxi company to represent them in the 
joint venture entity, as depicted in the diagram; 
• That the financial implications of the proposed structure for each operator be 
calculated. Only if operators were better off under the proposed model, would the 
taxi industry be in favour of the proposed entity structure; 
• That skills transfer to the taxi operators take place; 
• That the entry requirements for operators into the joint venture be clearly defined; 
• That the distribution of profits be clearly defined; and 
• That the issue of transferability of shares be explored and defined. 
 
7.4.5  Results from the focus group exercise 
 
Based on the positive results from the focus group exercise, the proposed model could be 
provisionally accepted. With an acceptable framework for the proposed solution in place, 
the next step would entail addressing the detailed requirements of the new entity structure.  
This would be based on the feedback obtained from the stakeholder focus group as 
presented above.  While a final solution to all of these issues will not be reached without a 
new, extensive negotiation process, the key principles underlying this solution will now be 
discussed below. 
 
7.5 DEVELOPMENT OF A DETAILED FRAMEWORK BASED ON THE  
FOCUS GROUP’S REQUIREMENTS 
 
7.5.1 Entry requirements and eligibility to own shares 
 
As per the requirements of the Department of Transport documented in chapter 6, 
participation in the joint venture will be limited to legal taxi operators with valid operating 
licenses for routes within the geographic area of the new contract. Taxi operators will be 
required to give up their current operating licenses in order to become part of the new joint 
venture. In exchange for a legal operating license, a taxi operator would be eligible for a 
single share in the new taxi entity (Taxi Co). Operators with more than one valid operating 
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license will be eligible for one share for each operating license. In this way, the operators 
with larger operations under the old system would gain a correspondingly larger share in 
the new business as well. This is considered to be a fair system, since the relinquishment of 
their original operating licenses would require them to give up a larger source of income 
than a comparatively smaller operator who might have only a single operating license.  
 
On the side of the bus industry, only the Algoa Bus Company and PEPBOA would be 
eligible for shareholding in the joint venture company. Shareholding in Bus Co would have 
to be resolved through negotiations between the two parties, but with comparative 
operational size as a starting point, the proportion would be approximately 90-10 in favour 
of the Algoa Bus Company. 
7.5.2 Financial model 
 
In order to achieve buy-in from the respective parties, the financial implications of the new 
joint venture entity for each of the stakeholders had to be demonstrated. To do so, the 
financial model for the new entity had to be developed. As explained by Edgar Sandoval in 
his presentation in chapter 4, it was the business model that ultimately convinced the 
transport operators in Bogota, Colombia, to participate in the new transport companies. The 
development of the business model was therefore an integral part of the integration process. 
 
It should be noted that the development of the financial model for the new entity 
constituted a substantial project in its own right, and falls outside the scope of this study.  
However, the results of the financial model did impact the acceptability of the joint venture 
structure, and the integration of the transport industry as a whole, insofar as it was the 
single biggest issue of concern to the taxi operators prior to their acceptance of the 
proposed structure. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to note that the proposed 
earnings per individual taxi operator, as defined in the financial plan, was of sufficient 
value to convince the majority of taxi operators that they would be financially better off as 
participants in the integrated joint venture model, than they had previously been when 
working as individual taxi operators. 
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7.5.3 Joint venture shareholders agreement 
 
According to Herzfeld (1990:40), the basic shareholders agreement is the foundation of the 
joint venture entity. The level of detail required will vary from case to case, but a number 
of general issues are identified which should be addressed in the standard shareholders 
agreement of most joint venture companies. According to Herzfeld (1990:42), citing Gavin 
(1980), the more thoroughly each topic is addressed in the initial agreement between 
shareholders and the new entity, the less likely will be future disagreements and unexpected 
risks.  
 
The most important point that should be included in all such agreements is the definition of 
the business of the proposed joint venture. This becomes particularly important when one 
or more of the participants are already engaged in the kind of business that the joint venture 
will be conducting, since they will be able to affect the level of competition to which the 
new joint venture will be subjected to (Herzfeld, 1990:42). In the case of Nelson Mandela 
Bay, this is of particular relevance, as both partners are historical operators in the industry 
that the joint venture will operate in. 
 
In addition to this issue, the basic shareholders’ agreement addresses a number of the key 
elements identified as issues requiring resolution in the focus group exercise. These are 
addressed below. 
7.5.4 Capital structure and method of subscription 
 
Shareholding in a joint venture fulfills the same role as in any other limited liability 
company. In certain situations however, it would be preferable to locate different classes of 
shares to the two or more parties to a joint venture. This provides for a situation where the 
share in the voting or controlling rights in the joint venture can be separated from the share 
in the profits. This means, for example, that a 60% to 40% profit sharing could exist, while 
control of the entity is shared equally between the two participants (Herzfeld, 1990:43). 
 
 119 
This is an issue of particular relevance to the Nelson Mandela Bay case. Separating control 
from relative shareholding will address the key issue of decision-making control as 
expressed during negotiations between the bus and taxi industry to date. 
7.5.5 Transferability of shares 
 
The transferability of shares presents unusual complications to a joint venture. Should 
participants be free to dispose of their shares to outsiders, it could result in incompatible 
parties being forced into working together to the detriment of the joint venture. Therefore, it 
is usual for joint ventures to either prohibit the transfer of shares by participants or to 
impose some sort of time delay on any such transfer. If this is not legally possible, existing 
shareholders are often given a pre-emptive right of first purchase in order to avoid 
unwanted outsiders from entering into the venture.  However, in such cases, determining a 
suitable market value for the shares can be difficult, and the price at which such a pre-
emptive right can be exercised is often a point of contention. Herzfeld suggests that in such 
a case the pre-emptive right should either be exercised at a bona-fide price offered by an 
outsider, or at a price determined by an independent valuation (Herzfeld, 1990:44). 
7.5.6 Minority protection 
 
Where the shareholdings of the two parties are unequal, and where more than two parties 
are involved, minority protection is an important matter for agreement. According to 
Herzfeld, (1990:45), the simplest way to achieve this is to require unanimity, or a suitably 
qualified majority, for resolutions at shareholders and directors meetings. Should even 
more minority protection be required, a list of topics requiring a positive resolution by 
directors or shareholders can be stipulated in the shareholders agreement, so that 
management cannot make decisions on the listed topics without obtaining a unanimous or 
suitable majority decision from the board or the shareholders. 
 
According to Herzfeld(1990:45), a list requiring unanimity might include the following 
matters: 
• Changes in the share structure of the company; 
• Approval for capital expenditure and asset disposals beyond pre-agreed limits; 
• Increases in the borrowing limits of the company; 
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• Acquisition, disposal and winding up of the business; 
• Major changes in the nature of the company’s business; 
• Appointment or dismissal of key personnel; and 
• Major litigation. 
 
The above list merely serves as an example, and more items can be added as deemed 
necessary in the particular joint venture situation. The purpose of the list remains the 
protection of minority partners in the joint venture.  
 
In the case of Nelson Mandela Bay, this issue is relevant insofar as the smaller bus 
operators (PEPBOA) need to be accommodated into the integrated entity. Due to their 
relative size, they will be a very small minority in the proposed new entity, and minority 
protection will therefore be a high priority to them. However, this issue in itself creates the 
environment conducive to the creation of deadlocks, which is addressed as a separate point 
below. 
7.5.7 Deadlock 
 
Protecting the interests of minorities in a partnership is necessary in order to arrive at a 
mutually beneficial agreement in the first place. However, the mere fact that some 
decisions in the new joint venture will need minority co-operation in order to be executed 
by its very nature weakens the speed and efficiency of the decision-making process.  
 
Herzfeld (1995:47) describes it as follows: 
“Evidently, the more matters that are required to be addressed on the basis of unanimity, 
the greater the risk that the venture will experience a conflict which cannot be resolved and 
which, if serious enough, will produce deadlock.”  
 
In the business environment, deadlocks in the decision-making process can have serious 
consequences for the competitiveness of the firm, and even threaten its continued ability to 
operate (Herzfeld, 1995:47). 
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Herzfeld (1995:48) recommends that the shareholders’ agreement makes provision for the 
eventuality of a deadlock, and provides alternatives for the resolution thereof in advance. 
Examples of possible solutions to the problem include giving a casting vote to the chairman 
of the board of directors or to submit the dispute to arbitration. However, both of these 
options have disadvantages. By awarding a casting vote to an individual, the party to which 
that person is affiliated will naturally be able to dominate the decision-making process. On 
the other hand, by submitting the dispute to arbitration, the venture is placed at the mercy of 
individuals who might not have sufficient knowledge about the industry in which the 
company operates to make the correct business decision with regard to the deadlock 
situation.  
 
An alternative to the above is to provide a so-called “swing-vote” capacity to an additional 
director or small shareholder, who will be able to break any potential deadlock with his 
vote. However, this effectively places this party in the position of so-called “kingmaker”, 
and upsets the balance of power within the venture. Additionally, the resolution of a 
deadlock to the dissatisfaction of any of the parties, will merely lead to the creation of more 
deadlocks by this party as their unhappiness with the situation grows (Herzfeld, 1995:48). 
 
The issue of deadlock remains a challenging one and is of particular significance for the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Transport integration. Where possible the potential deadlock 
situations should be provided for in the original shareholder’s agreement. However, the 
potential for deadlocks will remain and in those situations the options described above will 
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The final option for the resolution of an unbreakable deadlock remains the dissolution of 
the joint venture. Should it be required, it can either result in one party buying out the 
shares of the other dissatisfied party, or simply the ending of operations and the closing 
down of the venture altogether (Herzfeld, 1995:48). This is a result that should be avoided 
if at all possible. 
 
The issue of deadlock is the major reason why a purely 50/50 split in shareholding between 
the two major partners is unlikely to be suitable in the case of Nelson Mandela Bay.  
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7.5.8 Composition of board and management 
 
Since the day-to-day control of the joint venture will be in the hands of the directors of the 
new corporation, the composition of the board is of great significance to the participants. 
Whoever has control of the board will have control of the joint venture.  Therefore, the 
manner in which directors are appointed to the board is one of the most important issues 
that need to be addressed in the joint venture agreement. Since the shareholders usually 
elect the directors, the agreement will have to stipulate the number of directors that can be 
appointed from each party. Of course, if the shareholding is not split equally, this will mean 
that one party will be able to dominate the other on the board of directors of the new entity.  
 
Herzfeld (1990:50) suggests that a way to overcome this is to allocate different classes of 
shares to different participants. Key issues that need to be addressed in the agreement are 
the quorum required as well as the requirements of either unanimity or qualified majorities. 
The board chairman – if required – can be appointed on a rotating basis in order to balance 
the power between the two parties. The chairman need not be allocated a casting vote, 
especially if control of the board is precisely balanced between the participants.  
 
Irrespective of the composition of the board, the parties will usually want to stipulate in 
advance how the new entity will be managed, as well as how the chief executive officer 
will be appointed.  Where one of the parties is able to dominate the joint venture due to a 
larger equity investment and consequent portion of the shareholding, it is even more 
important for the management structure to be agreed upon in advance (Herzfeld, 1990:51). 
 
The composition of the board will be one of the key issues to be resolved when considering 
a joint venture between the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay. Ultimately, a 
board needs to be created which can manage the new venture efficiently and ensure the 
sustainability of the new operation. Indecision, deadlocks or political interference in the 
business decisions at board level are a significant business risk and need to be avoided as a 
matter of priority. The composition of the board therefore, needs to be negotiated and 
resolved between the parties before a joint venture is embarked upon. A strong, decisive 
and competent board of directors will be a key requirement if the joint venture is to meet its 
goals successfully.  
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7.5.9 Methods of financing 
 
In order to establish a new joint venture entity, financing will be required. The source of 
these funds can either be capital contributions from one or more of the participants or 
borrowings obtained by the joint venture company (Herzfeld, 1990:55). The costs of 
financing such loans need to be taken into account when the financial forecasts for the new 
entity are conducted.  
 
Although this is a key part of the Nelson Mandela Bay integration project, a detailed 
examination of the financing solutions falls outside the scope of this paper. However, it is 
important that issues that would affect the likelihood of obtaining financing are considered 
during the integration process. According to Mr. Graham Smith, from HSBC, the 
management and shareholding structure of the company will be of crucial importance when 
the banks or financing institutions evaluate the risk of providing loans to the company. The 
ability to make clear decisions based on what’s best for the profitability of the business 
must be enshrined in the shareholders agreement. To the extent that this influences the 
integration strategy, it needs to be a priority during the integration process (Graham Smith, 
HSBC, National Transport Conference, Pretoria, 2008). 
7.5.10 Distribution of profits 
 
Repatriation of funds normally occurs via the payment of dividends to shareholders. If no 
party has the majority of shares in the joint venture, the payment of dividends out of 
available profits cannot be enforced by any one of the participants. In order to overcome 
this constraint, Herzfeld (1990:51) suggests that it is advisable to establish the dividend 
payout ratio in advance. This can be achieved by including a clause in the shareholders 
agreement that stipulates a fixed percentage of distributable profits to be paid out as a 
dividend to shareholders. Should any one party then vote against the dividend payout at any 
time, for whatever reason, they would be in breach of the shareholders agreement. Such a 
provision ensures that both parties can have guaranteed access to their share of the profits, 
provided that the joint venture has made sufficient profit to distribute to the shareholders.  
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This issue is very important in the case of Nelson Mandela Bay. As identified in the review 
of stakeholder requirements, the taxi operators will require guaranteed access to regular 
dividends to replace the cash they currently collect from their passengers on a daily basis. 
Without regular dividends, they will be left without income and would therefore be highly 
resistant to entering into any negotiated joint venture agreement with the bus industry. 
Setting out the distribution of income to the shareholders in the initial shareholders 
agreement will therefore be a non-negotiable requirement in this case. 
 
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter, all of the data gathered during the research study was combined and 
analysed in order to arrive at an integration model that could meet all of the key 
requirements of the case. After a rigorous process of logical, step by step decision-making, 
a final recommendation was arrived at. The answers to each of the sub-problems posed at 
the start of this case study were considered and used as references and inputs into this 
process. The resultant recommendation was presented to the stakeholders, for feedback and 
commentary. The result of this consultation process, was that the integration model was 
provisionally accepted, based on various conditions. In response to the stakeholder 
feedback, the detailed requirements of the conceptual model could be developed, based on 
a study of relevant literature. With the details added to the framework, a complete 
conceptual model was devised, and guidelines developed for its implementation.  
 
The end result presents a definitive and unambiguous answer to the main problem 
statement of this research study. In the next and final chapter of this study, the overall 
conclusion will be presented, together with recommendations for future research that could 
be conducted to resolve questions that remain unanswered, or require further clarification 
subsequent to the completion of this study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research study has sought to address the problem of integrating the bus and taxi 
industries in Nelson Mandela Bay into a viable entity structure for the provision of public 
transport to the city. In response to this problem, data was gathered from a wide range of 
sources in order to develop a framework for the creation of a suitable integration model.  
8.1 RECOMMENDED INTEGRATION MODEL 
 
The primary data gathering exercise, as documented in chapter 6, provided a 
comprehensive list of stakeholder requirements which the ultimate solution had to adhere 
to. The analysis of this data in chapter 7 allowed for the identification of the most 
appropriate integration model – namely the creation of a single joint venture company 
between the bus and taxi operators.  
 
The results of the data analysis exercise were supported by the findings of the literature 
study in chapter 3, which concluded that a joint venture strategy was more suitable than a 
merger strategy. Specifically, the literature study indicated that a joint venture strategy was 
more suitable for the following key reasons: 
• Joint ventures are often entered into for the purposes of a specific contract, as in the 
Nelson Mandela Bay case, whereas mergers are permanent arrangements; 
• Joint ventures are more suitable when substantial differences exist in the 
organisational cultures of the participants; 
• Joint ventures allow both partners to retain their existing identities, and therefore 
provide for a viable way in which the partnership can be ended, if necessary; and 
• Joint ventures allow for a trial period of cooperation for organisations who are 
unsure whether they are ready for a full merger. 
 
The key finding from the study visit to Bogota and Pereira, as documented in chapter 4, 
was that in addition to meeting the primary stakeholder requirements, the structure of the 
joint venture company must also make possible the operation of a viable and sustainable 
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business. Therefore, in order to define the structure and characteristics of the proposed joint 
venture company more clearly, the primary data gathered from the stakeholders had to be 
integrated with the secondary data from the literature study, as well as the observations 
from the study visits to Bogota and Pereira. 
 
In chapter 3, the key requirements that needed to be addressed in the creation of a joint 
venture were discussed. Chief of these was that a joint venture should be a partnership of 
equals. This was also reflected in the study of stakeholder requirements in chapter 6, where 
both the bus and taxi industries indicated that they did not wish to be dominated by the 
other party in the partnership. Therefore, the starting point in the creation of the proposed 
company structure was that the bus and taxi industry needed to be equal partners in the 
proposed venture. 
 
In order for the taxi industry to be on an equal footing to their joint venture partners, it was 
necessary to incorporate the independent taxi operators into a unified entity. To achieve 
this, a new company would have to be created to represent all participating taxi operators. 
Instead of being individual businessmen, the taxi operators will now become shareholders 
in a jointly owned company. For the purposes of this paper, this company is referred to as 
Taxi Co. On the side of the bus industry Bus Co would be established to represent the 
Algoa Bus Company and the smaller PEPBOA. 
 
The newly established Bus Co and Taxi Co would then be joint shareholders in the 
proposed joint venture company. The joint venture company will sign five separate 
contracts with the NMBM to provide public transport to the city.  The proposed structure is 
depicted in the diagram below. Additional diagrammatical presentations of the structural 
relationship between the parties are included in Appendix E. 
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               FIGURE 8.1   RECOMMENDED ENTITY STRUCTURE 
TAXI Co.
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X% 
shareholding
Recommended structure
 
     Source: The author 
 
The key characteristics of the recommended structure are as follows: 
• Algoa Bus Company (ABC) and PEPBOA will purchase shares in a new transport 
company (Bus Co); 
• The existing individual taxi operators will purchase shares in a new transport 
company (Taxi Co). The qualification requirements for shares will be the ownership 
of a valid operating license; 
• Bus Co and Taxi Co will then purchase shares in the joint venture company (JV 
Co); 
• The Board of Directors of the joint venture company should be comprised of an 
agreed upon number of representatives from Bus Co and Taxi Co, but should 
predominantly be comprised of qualified and experienced professionals; 
• The joint venture company will conclude five separate transport contracts with the 
NMBM, one per geographical area, to provide a public transport service to the city. 
According to this contract, the joint venture company will be paid per kilometer 
traveled, instead of per passenger carried. This is a key lesson learned from the 
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models in Colombia, and will remove the incentive for overcrowding of vehicles by 
the operators; 
• PEPBOA and ABC can either lease or sell their existing vehicles, workshops and 
other assets to Bus Co or directly to the joint venture company;  
• Similarly, PEPBOA and ABC can second staff to the joint venture company; and 
• The existing taxi operators will also have the option of leasing or selling their 
vehicles to either Taxi Co or directly to the joint venture company. The benefit of 
selling the vehicles to Taxi Co is that this company is then in a strong position to 
tender for work independently after the initial contract period and the need for the 
joint venture company expires.  
 
In terms of the minimum criteria generated by the stakeholder interviews, the suggested 
integration model successfully provides for the following key requirements; 
• Formalisation of the taxi industry; 
• Integration of, and skills transfer between the existing public transport operators; 
• Equitable ownership and division of profits; 
• Involvement of existing transport operators in key decision-making; 
• Ability to address a phased implementation of the new transport system; 
• Retention of the identities of the existing operators allowing for their independent 
development and competition after the initial contract period; 
• An efficient exit mechanism for shareholders at the end of the initial contract 
period; 
• Promotes an integrated service; and 
• Legal entity therefore limited liability. 
 
The literature study provided clear guidelines on how the integration process should be 
conducted subsequent to the selection of a suitable integration model. The building of trust 
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during the inter-organisational negotiations, strong leadership from management, and open 
and honest communication with employees and stakeholders within all participating 
organisations emerged as key contributors to a joint venture’s success. 
 
8.2 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The selection of an integration strategy and the development of a structural model to 
integrate the transport operators into a unified entity have been completed.  A joint venture 
company was selected as the most appropriate integration model given the unique 
requirements of the situation. The method by which this was achieved was documented and 
the results presented.  However, the negotiations surrounding the physical integration of the 
participating entities are still underway. This process would be well served by the 
application of the lessons learned from the literature study, in chapter 3.  The five steps 
provided by Harris Helmer (2002:1) for achieving successful joint venture integration, are: 
• Preparing leadership to manage change; 
• Dealing with the impact of change; 
• Communicating the change; 
• Working with the survivors of change; and 
• Protecting the business from change. 
 
Each of these factors have been encountered to a greater or lesser extent during the 
stakeholder discussions to date, and each will remain a challenge that will have to be 
effectively overcome if a successful joint venture firm is to be created. The documenting of 
this process, and a full analysis of the results thereof, will be a worthwhile subject for a 
future research study.   
 
8.3 PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The major problem encountered during the research process was the pioneering nature of 
the study. Similar studies in a South African context did not exist and could therefore not 
serve as points of reference. Furthermore, while comparative studies in other countries 
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provided useful data in some respects, the unique socio-economic environment in South 
Africa presented different challenges from those faced in regions such as South America. 
To compensate for this shortcoming, significant reliance was placed on obtaining an in-
depth understanding of the specific requirements of the stakeholders, in order to develop an 
appropriate solution to the main problem. 
 
Due to the strong focus on the relevant stakeholder needs, the recommended integration 
model is highly specific to the situation in Nelson Mandela Bay. While the lessons learned 
in terms of the process that was followed can be of great value to similar projects 
elsewhere, caution should be exercised when gauging the model’s suitability for application 
in other scenarios. Stakeholder needs will differ on a case by case basis, and the resultant 
solution will change accordingly. The true worth of the study is that it serves as an example 
of how a transport integration problem might be approached, and demonstrates a process by 
which a potential solution could be developed.  
 
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the introduction to chapter 1, the statement was made that the goal of this research study 
is the achievement of mutually beneficial solutions for the integration of competing parties 
in an environment of change and uncertainty. After an exhaustive research process, an 
extensive analytical exercise, and the critical evaluation of the scenarios generated, a 
solution to this challenge has been proposed. The result has been the development of a 
groundbreaking integration model for the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay. If 
successfully implemented, this model would set an example for other cities in South Africa 
to follow.  From this perspective, this research study is therefore a valuable addition to the 
existing body of knowledge and extremely relevant, given current and future transport 
developments in South Africa and internationally. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
MAP OF NELSON MANDELA BAY MUNICIPAL AREA 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MAP OF THE PROPOSED CONTRACT AREAS 
1
1 Motherwell
2
2 Njoli Area
3
3 Cleary Park
4
4 Western Suburbs
5
5 Uitenhage
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APPENDIX C 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK 
 
The questions below served to guide the semi-structured interviews towards the most 
important issues that needed to be addressed by the proposed integration model. Therefore, 
the interviews did not take place on a rigid, predetermined basis, but corresponded to the 
semi-structured interview format as indicated by Collis and Hussey in chapter 5. As long as 
the content of the interview covered the areas in question, whether via the general 
discussion or prompted by a specific question, the goal of the interview was considered to 
be achieved. 
 
Question 1 
Describe the current relationship between your organisation/group and the other 
stakeholders in the local transport industry. 
 
Question 2 
What are your expectations with regard to the outcome of the integration process? 
 
Question 3 
In your view, how will the integration of the bus and taxi industries in Nelson Mandela Bay 
affect your stakeholder group? 
 
Question 4 
What, in your view, are the main challenges that stand in the way of the successful 
integration of the transport operators in Nelson Mandela Bay? 
 
Question 5 
What are your minimum requirements from the process? 
 
Question 6 
What suggestions (if any) do you have with regard to a preferred integration model? 
 137 
 
Question 7 
What are the critical issues, from your point of view, that need to be addressed in the 
integration process? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
INTEGRATED DECISION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Criteria 
Criterion 
Number 
Criterion Description 
1 Integration of bus and taxi industry 
2 Formalisation and uplifting of the taxi industry 
3 Inclusion of majority of transport operators 
4 Transfer of skills from the bus to the taxi industry 
5 Provision of a reliable, safe and efficient transport service to the public 
6 Retention of separate identity 
7 Exit strategy at conclusion of contract 
8 Competition within the system 
9 Fair distribution of routes 
10 Fair access to subsidisation 
11 Acceptable shareholding and profit sharing 
12 Management and decision-making control in the new structure 
13 Creation of five separate transport contracts – one per geographical area in 
the PTP 
14 Speed and ease of implementation 
15 Minimum reliance on subsidies 
16 Access to external financing 
17 Ease of termination at end of contract 
18 Phasing in implementation in separate contract areas 
19 Seamless, integrated system 
20 Long term sustainability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
Integrated Decision Matrix 
Criterion 
number 
Score: 
Merger 
Score: Five 
Mergers  
Score: JV 
Company 
Score: 5 
JV 
Companies  
Score: JV 
Contract 
Score: 5 
JV 
Contracts 
1 5 5 4 4 1 1 
2 5 4 5 3 1 1 
3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 5 4 5 4 2 1 
5 5 3 5 3 1 1 
6 0 0 5 5 5 5 
7 0 0 5 4 5 5 
8 0 5 0 3 0 3 
9 5 2 5 3 2 1 
10 5 2 5 3 3 3 
11 5 5 5 5 5 5 
12 5 4 5 4 4 4 
13 5 5 5 5 5 5 
14 1 1 3 2 5 5 
15 2 1 3 2 5 4 
16 5 3 5 3 2 1 
17 0 0 4 3 5 5 
18 5 5 5 5 5 5 
19 5 3 5 3 2 1 
20 1 1 4 1 1 1 
Total 69 58 88 70 64 62 
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APPENDIX E 
 
RECOMMENDED INTEGRATION MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
TAXI Co.
PEPBOA ABC
BUS Co.
JOINT VENTURE Co.
NMBM
T1 T2 T3 T4
X% 
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X% 
shareholding
Recommended structure
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TAXI Co.
PEPBOA ABC
BUS Co.
JOINT VENTURE Co.
NMBM
T1 T2 T3 T4
X% 
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X% 
shareholding
Dividends declared 
and paid 
Distribution of profits
 
 
 
TAXI Co.
PEPBOA ABC
BUS Co.
JOINT VENTURE Co.
NMBM
T1 T2 T3 T4
X% 
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X%
shareholding
X% 
shareholding
Board of Directors 
responsible
for day-to-day 
decision making
Shareholders vote at 
AGMs
Decision making
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TAXI Co.
PEPBOA ABC
BUS Co.
JOINT VENTURE Co.
NMBM
T1 T2 T3 T4
Resources before phasing-in
Vehicles, workshops,
human resources etc
Vehicles
 
 
 
TAXI Co.
PEPBOA ABC
BUS Co.
JOINT VENTURE Co.
NMBM
T1 T2 T3 T4
Resources after phasing-in
Vehicles, workshops,
human resources etc
Vehicles
 
 
